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In his article Professor Gildin challenges the applicability of
the qualified immunity defense in actions brought under the federal
disability statutes. Specifically, he contends that the qualified im-
munity defense should not be available in actions for damages
brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Although these acts are very powerful tools to protect the rights of
disabled individuals, lower courts have slowly eviscerated a key en-
forcement mechanism-the remedy of money damages-by trans-
ferring the qualified immunity defense permitted in § 1983 actions
to actions brought under these acts. In support of his thesis, Profes-
sor Gildin analyzes the text and legislative histories of these acts
and argues that neither of these supports the existence of the quali-
fied immunity defense. He also finds that there is no historical
linkage between § 1983 and the disability statutes that justifies bor-
rowing qualified immunity from § 1983. Finally, Professor Gildin
argues that judges should not legislate this defense as Congress at
the time it enacted the disability statutes did not intend for this de-
fense to be available.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress has endeavored to guarantee the
equal participation of the disabled in all aspects of American life
through the passage of three statutes-the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,1 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 and the Individu-
als with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) (hereinafter "The
Acts").3 Consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's admonition that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University.
B.A. 1973, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1976, Stanford Law School.
The author expresses his gratitude to Megan Farrell Lawless, Hannah Greenwald, and Shawn
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1. 29 U.S.C. § 701-7976 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
3. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 14,000-14,910 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he re-
ceives an injury,"4 under these acts aggrieved individuals may bring an
action for damages against an individual government official who in-
tentionally discriminates based upon disability.5 This damage remedy
is an essential component of the trilogy of disability statutes, as it com-
pensates the victim for the harm caused by discrimination and deters
government officials from engaging in the proscribed discrimination.
The vitality of the damage remedy, however, has been imperilled
by a line of lower federal court decisions permitting public officials to
propound qualified immunity as a defense to suits for damages
brought under the disability discrimination statutes.6 This immunity
shields individual government actors from accountability for inten-
tional discrimination in all circumstances where it was not "clearly es-
tablished" that the statutes proscribed the conduct in the particular
factual circumstances presented.' Even where the unlawfulness of the
official's act was "clearly established," damages nonetheless will not
be awarded if the official proves either (a) he did not know and should
not have known of the right, or (b) he did not know and should not
have known that his conduct violated the right.'
If the defense of qualified immunity is accepted under the disabil-
ity statutes, in most instances it can be expected that plaintiffs will be
barred from recovering damages against government officials. In con-
struing qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 (the 1871 Civil
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). In Anderson, the Supreme Court held
that to be "clearly established,"
[the] contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would under-
stand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful . . . but it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.
Id. at 640 (citation omitted).
8. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in response to the
states' inability or unwillingness to protect blacks against the unlawful activities of the Ku Klux
Klan. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1961); Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and
Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U.
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Rights Act from which courts have borrowed immunity for the disa-
bility discrimination statutes °) the United States Supreme Court has
declared that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incom-
petent or those who knowingly violate the law."'" Furthermore, at
least one federal court of appeals has presumed "[t]hat qualified im-
munity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in excep-
tional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made
against them in their individual capacities."'2
This article contends that the defense of qualified immunity may
not be asserted in actions for damages brought under the Acts. Con-
gress did not confer qualified immunity in the text of any of the disa-
bility discrimination statutes, even though at the time of their
enactment Congress was well aware of how to make clear its intent to
grant immunity. 3 In addition, implying immunity is contrary to the
legislative history of the Acts, which plainly prescribes that the Acts
are to be liberally construed to provide disabled individuals with
broad remedies should they suffer discrimination.14
L. REV. 1, 5 (1985); Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1153-56 (1977). However, § 1983 broadly authorizes a federal civil rights action
against persons acting under color of state law to redress deprivations of any right protected by
the Constitution, whether the official whose action gave rise to the violation was acting in ac-
cordance with or in contravention of state or local law. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. Individual
state or local officials are personally liable for actual and punitive damages where there is an
affirmative link between the official's conduct and the constitutional deprivation. See Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 264-65 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-76 (1976). However, these offi-
cials may assert as a defense qualified, and in some instances absolute, immunity when sued for
damages. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 513 (1985); Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190-97 (1984); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-08; Procunier, 434 U.S. at 560-66;
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
Local governmental entities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for invasions of constitu-
tional rights caused by their employees acting within the scope of employment. See Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, the local entity is liable only if the
acts of the official giving rise to the violation represent governmental policy or custom. See id. at
690-91; Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988); Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 471 (1986). Unlike individual officials, the local government
may not invoke any immunity defense. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638
(1980).
State governmental entities may not be sued directly for either damages or equitable relief
under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 674 (1974). However, prospective injunctive relief may be obtained against a state
through the fiction of suing the individual state official in her official, rather than individual,
capacity if the violation was visited pursuant to a policy or custom of the state. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
10. See infra Part III.
11. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
12. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
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The courts that have allowed a qualified immunity defense to be
erected by government officials sued for intentional discrimination
have not attempted to reconcile the defense with the text and legisla-
tive history of the Acts. Instead, without analysis the courts have re-
flexively extended the qualified immunity available in actions for
constitutional violations filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.15 Transmuting
immunity from § 1983 to the disability discrimination statutes is en-
tirely inappropriate for three reasons. First, the Acts are independent
congressional measures that were not modeled after § 1983.16 Second,
the fact that qualified immunity under § 1983 originated in state com-
mon law confirms that § 1983 immunity is inapplicable to actions
brought under the Acts.17 In the era in which the disability discrimina-
tion statutes were enacted, statutes had supplanted the common law
as the source of immunity in state law. Under the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution,18 these state statutes cannot immu-
nize officials who transgress the dictates of federal statutes, nor did
Congress so intend. Finally, even under its broad power to fashion
remedies for implied causes of action, the judiciary may not legislate a
qualified immunity defense that Congress did not intend for actions
under the Acts.' 9
II. THE CONTOURS OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF
THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
To assess why qualified immunity is not an appropriate defense
under the Acts, it is first necessary to understand the contours of the
causes of action under the Acts. Accordingly, this section will sepa-
rately analyze the cause of action under each of the disability discrimi-
nation statutes, focusing upon the categories of potential defendants
and the circumstances under which damages may be recovered.
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to make employment
and participation in society more feasible for the disabled.2 ° It was not
established to afford disabled individuals preferential status or to ac-
commodate their needs in every given situation. Rather, the Act was
designed to eliminate discrimination and "to assure that [disabled] in-
dividuals receive 'evenhanded treatment' in relation to [nondisabled]
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part VIA, VI.B.
17. See infra Part VI.C.
18. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
19. See infra Part VII.
20. Congress realized this purpose by creating funding for state rehabilitation programs,




individuals."21 Section 504 of the Act strives to achieve these goals by
providing that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with handicaps...
shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap,... be denied the bene-
fits of ... any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance."22 As the first federal statute to prohibit discrimination against
individuals with disabilities, § 504 is commonly referred to as "the civil
rights bill of the disabled."23
It is well established that individuals who have been discrimi-
nated against because of a disability have a private cause of action
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Act does not expressly
provide for a private civil action. The courts, however, have implied
the cause of action they deemed Congress to have intended when it
enacted § 504.24
1. Potential Defendants
According to the text of § 504 and the case law interpreting its
application, there are five groups of persons or entities against whom
a private cause of action may be maintained. An individual plaintiff
asserting a violation of his § 504 rights may bring suit against the fed-
eral government 25 as well as any state or local governmental entities
that receive federal funding.26 Section 504 also subjects government
21. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 304 (1985)).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
23. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).
24. The federal courts of appeals have uniformly held that a private cause of action exists.
See, e.g., Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 788 (6th Cir. 1996); Spence v. Shaw, 54
F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1995); J.L. v. Social Sec. Admin., 971 F.2d 260, 270 (9th Cir. 1992); Johnson
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1988); Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354, 359
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 1987); Jennings
v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036, 1040 (6th Cir. 1983); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d
Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977). Even though
the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether an implied private cause of
action exists for violations of § 504, the Court has decided a number of cases in which its hold-
ings touch or rest upon the existence of such a cause of action. For example, in Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, the Court held that at least "equitable action[s] for back-pay" were allowed
for intentional discrimination under § 504. 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984). In Lane v. Pena, the Court
held that awards of monetary damages are not available in suits against the federal government
for violations of § 504. See 518 U.S. 187, 193 (1996). In the dissenting opinion in Lane, Justice
Stevens wrote,
Lane was injured by that violation, and he is therefore entitled to maintain an action against
the agency under Section 504. The parties and the Court agree that damages are an appro-
priate form of relief for most violations of § 504 .... The only issue in this case is whether
Congress carved out a special immunity from damages liability for federal agencies acting in
a non-funding capacity ....
Id. at 201; cf Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992) (holding that com-
pensatory damages are available in implied cause of action under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972).
25. See, e.g., Lane, 518 U.S. 187.
26. Although current law permits it, an individual plaintiff was not always able to sue a
state government for § 504 violations. In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, the Supreme Court
held that because Congress had not clearly and unmistakably expressed its intent to abrogate the
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officials to liability in their individual capacities.27 Additionally, pri-
vate entities may be sued under § 504 so long as they qualify as pro-
grams or activities in receipt of federal funds.28 Until recently, it was
accepted that the directors, officers, and employees who were person-
ally responsible for creating and implementing the private entity's dis-
criminatory policies were also liable.2 9 Recently, however, a number
of courts have held that private individuals are not proper defendants
in actions under the Rehabilitation Act.3 0 Thus, whether private indi-
viduals are subject to suit under § 504 remains unclear.
states' 11th Amendment immunity in the text of the statute, the states were not subject to suit in
federal court for violations of § 504. 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). Congress, in response to the
Court's limiting opinion, amended § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to include a provision ex-
pressly stating that the states shall not be immune from suits in federal court for violations of
§ 504 by reason of the l1th Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
The constitutionality of this amendment was reviewed and confirmed in two recent cases.
See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997); Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F.
Supp. 1474, 1477 (D. Minn. 1996). In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme Court
held that Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the l1th Amendment
only if "Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity' ... and...
has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power."' 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (citations omitted).
Because Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in both
the Americans with Disabilities Act and in the 1986 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act and
because Congress was considered to have acted pursuant to its 14th Amendment power, the
courts held that the state governments were subject to suit. See Clark, 123 F.3d at 1269-70;
Mayer, 940 F. Supp. at 1477-80.
27. Government officials also may be sued in their official capacity. However, such suits are
only available if the plaintiff would otherwise have a cause of action against the governmental
entity itself. See, e.g., P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1990); Doe v. City of
Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (N.D. IlI. 1994). In general, official capacity suits merely repre-
sent an additional way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). For this reason, as long as the government entity
receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official capacity suit is, in all respects other
than name, treated as a suit against the entity.
28. See, e.g., Guertin v. Hackerman, 496 F. Supp. 593, 595-96 (S.D. Tex. 1980). In 1984, the
Supreme Court limited the scope of § 504 by narrowly defining "program or activity" to include
only specific programs or activities receiving federal funds. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984). The Court rejected the argument that the Act should apply to the entire
institution, even if only a small division of it was receiving federal funds. See id. at 571. In 1988,
Congress responded to this decision by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which amended
§ 504. See Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 29 (1988). The 1988 amendment defined the meaning of
"program or activity" so that in its application the Rehabilitation Act would prohibit discrimina-
tion throughout an entire institution as opposed to just those programs receiving federal funds.
29. See, e.g., Johnson v. New York Hosp., 897 F. Supp. 83, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
30. See Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95 C1401, 1995 WL 631804, at *4 (N.D. I11. Oct. 24,
1995); Romand v. Zimmerman, 881 F. Supp. 806, 812 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Haltek v. Village of Park
Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1994). This split of authority in the federal district courts
is the result of a 1992 congressional amendment to the Rehabilitation Act which provided that in
employment discrimination cases alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the standards of
the ADA would apply for the purpose of determining whether the Rehabilitation Act has been
violated. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1995). Significantly, under Title I of the ADA, only a "covered
entity," which includes an "employer," is subject to suit for discriminating against a qualified
individual with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111(2), 12,111(a) (1994). An "employer" is de-
fined as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees in
his employment. See § 12,111(5)(A). Because of this definition, a supervisory employee is not
subject to suit under Title I of the ADA. See infra note 50.
Consequently, some courts have interpreted this amendment as exempting from Rehabilita-




The remedies available to a successful § 504 plaintiff originate in
§ 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act. Section 505(a)(2) states:
[T]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et. seq.] shall be
available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by
any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such
assistance under [§ 504] of this title.31
The courts initially restricted the remedies available under § 505(a)(2)
to equitable relief, the withdrawal of federal funds from the program
in violation of the Act, 32 and attorneys' fees. 33 However, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 4 all appropriate remedies, including damages, are now
available.
In Franklin, the Court held that damages are recoverable in an
implied cause of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, a statute with language similar to that of § 504. 3 1 In so hold-
ing, the Court relied upon "[t]he general rule . . . that absent clear
direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the
power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action
brought pursuant to a federal statute. ' 36 Finding no congressional in-
tent to limit recovery, federal courts have applied the presumption
that all appropriate remedies, including compensatory and punitive
damages, are available to redress violation of § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.37
812; Haltek, 864 F. Supp. at 804-05. In Haltek, the court held that because the supervisory em-
ployee defendants did not fit the definition of "employer" as set forth by the ADA, they could
not be subjected to suit under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 805. This
holding would preclude suit against an officer or an employee of a private organization regard-
less of the individual's discriminatory conduct.
However, this construction of the Rehabilitation Act was rejected in Johnson, 897 F. Supp.
at 86. The Johnson court found that "Congress did not intend the ADA's definition of 'em-
ployer' to restrict the previously unencumbered application of the Rehabilitation Act." Id. The
court further held that it seemed "unlikely that Congress expanded the Rehabilitation Act's
coverage to employers that do not receive federal funds, and at the same time circumscribed the
Act's coverage of federal fund recipients to those that employ more than 14 workers." Id. Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that an individual can be liable under the Rehabilitation Act while
exempt from liability under the ADA. See id. Further support for the Johnson decision may be
found in § 12,201 of the ADA, which provides: "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973." 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a) (1994).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
33. The Rehabilitation Act provides that in any action or proceeding to redress a violation
of a provision of the Act, "the court, in its discretion, may allow any prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).
34. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
35. See id. at 71.
36. Id. at 70-71.
37. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998)
("The law is well settled that intentional violations of Title VI, and thus ... the Rehabilitation
No. 31
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While damages are ordinarily recoverable for violation of the Re-
habilitation Act, there is one class of defendants that may not be sued
for damages. In Lane v. Pena, the Supreme Court held that Congress
did not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity to suits
seeking recovery of monetary damage awards.38 Therefore, under no
circumstances may a prevailing plaintiff recover monetary damages
against the federal government, although federal officials remain indi-
vidually liable for damages caused by their discriminatory conduct.
To establish a prima facie case under § 504,
a plaintiff must show: (1) that he has a disability for purposes of
the . . . Act; (2) that he was "otherwise qualified" for the benefit
that has been denied; (3) that he has been denied the benefits
"solely by reason" of his disability; and (4) that the benefit is part
of a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
39
To obtain equitable relief under § 504 a plaintiff need not establish a
discriminatory intent.40 However, to recover monetary damages, a
plaintiff must further prove that the defendant's actions were
intentional.4 '
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress expanded its effort to guarantee that individuals with
disabilities will have the opportunity to participate equally and fully in
American life by passing the Americans with Disabilities Act.42 As
Act, can call for an award of money damages."); Schultz v. YMCA of the United States, 139 F.3d
286, 290 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that while damages are recoverable under § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act, damages are not recoverable for emotional distress absent physical or economic dam-
age or proof of malice); Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 63 F.3d 1404, 1415 (6th Cir. 1995)
(noting that Congress has never acted to limit the remedies available to § 504 plaintiffs, even
though it has amended other aspects of the Act and has been aware that the presumption of the
availability of all appropriate damages would apply absent its express indication to the contrary);
Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler, 980 F. Supp. 1144, 1148-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding punitive dam-
ages are recoverable under the Rehabilitation Act); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 190-91
(1996) (discussing the scope of available remedies under the Rehabilitation Act).
38. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 195-98.
39. Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Flight v. Gloeckler, 68 F.3d
61, 63 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995).
40. See Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1998).
41. See id. at 674; Wood v. President of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (11th
Cir. 1992); Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schs., 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984); DeLeo v. City
of Stanford, 919 F. Supp. 70, 73 (D. Conn. 1995); Tafaoya v. Bobroff, 865 F. Supp. 742, 751
(D.N.M. 1994). Furthermore, in the context of the education of disabled children, to demon-
strate a violation of § 504, the plaintiff must prove either bad faith or a gross misjudgment. See
Todd v. Elkins Sch. Dist. No. 10, No. 97-3258, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8083, at *3-5 (4th Cir. Apr.
27, 1998). "Liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a sub-
stantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id. at *3
(quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). Damages for emotional distress are
also most likely available only upon a showing of actual animus. See Schultz, 139 F.3d at 291.
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994). The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990, and was
passed by huge bipartisan majorities in both houses. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILrIES Acr:
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS 1-49 to 1-50 (Jonathan R. Mook ed., 1996) (ex-
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Congress stated, "society has tended to isolate and segregate individu-
als with disabilities, and despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a se-
rious and pervasive social problem."43 Congress also recognized that
disabled individuals face extraordinary barriers and discrimination by
"outright intentional . . . segregation," and often have "no legal re-
course to redress such discrimination."" Therefore, Congress passed
the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties, '"" "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing . . . individuals with disabilities,"46 and "to ensure that the
Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established in [the ADA] on behalf of individuals with disabilities."47
While § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act bars discrimination only in
programs that receive federal financial assistance, the ADA protects
the disabled from discrimination in the private sector.48 The ADA
also extended the prohibition against discrimination to all state and
local governmental entities, regardless of whether they receive federal
financial assistance.49 The ADA is divided into five major titles. How-
ever, Title II is the only ADA title under which qualified immunity is
likely to be an issue.50
plaining that the ADA passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 403-20 and the Senate
by a vote of 76-8).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(2). Congress also found that "the continuing existence of unfair
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifi-
ably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting
from dependency and nonproductivity." § 12,101(a)(9).




48. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54-55 (1990).
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,131-12,165 (1994).
50. The first three titles prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities with
respect to employment, public services (including transportation services), public accommoda-
tions, and telecommunications. The fourth title is comprised of miscellaneous provisions includ-
ing a provision explicitly abrogating the states' 11th Amendment immunity. This article,
however, addresses only Title II because the issue of qualified immunity does not arise under the
other titles due to limitations on remedies as well as restrictions on proceedings against certain
classes of defendants.
With respect to Title I, which prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified
individual with a disability, a majority of the courts have recently held that the statute does not
provide for individual liability. See, e.g., Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 404-05 (6th
Cir. 1997); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (1lth Cir. 1996); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investiga-
tions, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995); Mace v. City of Akron, 989 F. Supp. 949, 960 (N.D.
Ohio 1998); Kacher v. Houston Community College Sys., 974 F. Supp. 615, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1997);
Hardwick v. Curtis Trailers Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Or. 1995); Haltek v. Village of Park
Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1994). This recent shift towards rejecting individual liabil-
ity is based on interpretations of the Act's definition of the term "employer." Under Title I, an
"employer" is defined as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or
more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks.., and any agent of
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Title II of the ADA applies to employment discrimination51 as
well as to discrimination with respect to public services, including
such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5). Predictably, the meaning and purpose of the "any agent"
language was the principal focus in interpreting this statutory definition.
To determine whether the "any agent" language was indicative of a congressional intent to
hold individual employees liable, the Seventh Circuit relied upon decisions construing Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See
AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court of appeals looked to these acts because Title
VII is the origin of the term "employer" for both the ADA and the ADEA and "courts routinely
apply arguments regarding individual liability to all three statutes interchangeably." Id. at 1280.
The Seventh Circuit found that Congress included the "any agent" language to ensure that the
courts would impose respondeat superior liability upon employers for the acts of their employ-
ees. See id. at 1281. In addition, the court concluded that the remedial scheme of the ADA as
well as the threshold level of 15 employees for employer liability indicated Congress's intent to
hold only the employer liable. See id. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit held that a supervi-
sory employee could not be held individually liable for violations of the Act as an agent of a
designated employer. See id.
The court of appeals' conclusion is consistent with decisions regarding individual liability
under Title VII and the ADEA. Prior to 1995, the circuit courts were divided on the issue of
individual liability under these employment discrimination statutes. Currently, however, most of
the circuits that have addressed this issue have held that individuals may not be liable under the
Acts. For example, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits all have rejected individual liability. See Wathen, 115 F.3d at 404; Gregory M. P. Davis,
Comment, More Than a Supervisor Bargains for: Individual Liability Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Other Employment Discrimination Statutes, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 321, 328-29
(discussing the courts' shift to rejecting individual liability under the employment discrimination
statutes). Because of the common roots, it is likely that the circuits that have rejected individual
liability under Title VII and the ADEA also will reject individual liability under Title I of the
ADA. Because qualified immunity is a defense only to individual liability for damages, the doc-
trine does not appear to be relevant to Title I of the ADA.
Similarly, qualified immunity does not arise under Title III of the ADA. Title III of the
ADA concerns public accommodations and services operated by private entities. It states that
"no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of a disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a). However, the Act provides only for
injunctive relief as a remedy for violation of Title III. Because monetary remedies are not avail-
able, qualified immunity is inapplicable to this title. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6
(1975).
51. Although Title II does not explicitly address employment discrimination, several dis-
trict courts and the two circuit courts that have addressed this issue have all held that Title II
prohibits employment discrimination. See Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conser-
vation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 819 (11th Cir. 1998); Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50
F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995); Dominguez v. City of Council Bluffs, 974 F. Supp. 732, 736-37
(S.D. Iowa 1997); Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125,133 (D. Conn. 1997); Wagner
v. Texas A & M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Graboski v. Guiliani, 937 F.
Supp. 258, 267-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Eisfelder v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 847 F.
Supp. 78, 83 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Petersen v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276,
1278 (W.D. Wis. 1993). In reaching this decision, the courts have looked to the statutory lan-
guage of Title II, the relevant regulations as promulgated by the Department of Justice, and the
legislative history of the ADA. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 820-23; University of Md. Med. Sys.
Corp., 50 F.3d at 1264-67. However, application of the Title's prohibitions is complicated and
involves cross-referencing other parts of the statute as well as the Rehabilitation Act. For in-
stance, Title II incorporates the standards and employment regulations of Title I for entities that
are large enough to be covered by Title I (those who have 15 or more employees for each work-
ing day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks), whereas the standards of § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act apply to the remaining public entities that are not covered by Title I. See generally Mark
C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. &
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transportation. It provides that "no qualified individual with a disabil-
ity shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from the participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."52
For purposes of the ADA, a public entity is defined as: "(a) any State
or local government; (b) any department, agency, special purpose dis-
trict, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government;
and (c) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation and any com-
muter authority."53 Significantly, this definition has the effect of im-
posing nondiscriminatory standards and policies on a huge segment of
society. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, "Ti-
tle II of the ADA and its implementing regulations incorporate the
nondiscrimination principles of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
extend them to 'a much wider array of institutions and businesses, in-
cluding services provided by states and municipalities' without regard
to the receipt of federal financial assistance. 54
As with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, there is a private right of
action for violations of Title II of the ADA. In fact, Title II expressly
incorporates § 504's cause of action. It provides that "[t]he remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in section 794(a) of Title 29 [the appli-
cable section of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, proce-
dures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of
this title."55
1. Potential Defendants
Actions under Title II generally implicate the same classes of de-
fendants as litigation under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, although
there is no requirement under Title II that the defendant be a recipi-
ent of federal funds. Suits for violation of Title II may be brought
against state and local government entities56 as well as against govern-
ment officials in their individual capacities. 57 There is one aspect of
MARY L. Rav. 1089 (1995) (discussing and examining the interrelations of the prohibitions im-
posed by Title I, Title II, and § 504).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12,132.
53. § 12,131(1).
54. Raines v. Florida, 983 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting Easley v. Snider, 36
F.3d 297, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1994)).
55. § 12,133.
56. It has been decided that in enacting the ADA, Congress abrogated the states' 11th
Amendment immunity clearly and pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Therefore, states are
subject to suit for violations of the statute in federal court. See Coolbaugh v. State of Louisiana,
136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 58 (1998); Autio v. AFSCME, 157 F.3d
1141, 1141 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirmed by an evenly divided vote of the court en banc); Kimel v.
State of Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998); Amos v. Maryland Dep't of
Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 603 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other
grounds, 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
57. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998); Torcasio v. Murray,
57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995); Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1218-19 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
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Title II that affords lesser protection than the Rehabilitation Act.
While § 504 actions could be maintained against the federal govern-
ment for equitable relief but not damages, the United States govern-
ment may not be sued even for equitable relief to redress Title .II
violations.58
2. Remedies
Because Title II of the ADA incorporates § 504's remedies, a Ti-
tle II plaintiff is entitled to the full panoply of remedies, including
damages.59 There are, however, some restrictions on the damage rem-
edy. If the Title II plaintiff is asserting an employment discrimination
claim governed by the standards of Title I, the amount of damages
recoverable is constrained by the limitations on recovery set forth in
Title 1.60 In addition, a Title II plaintiff is precluded from receiving
punitive damages from government entities for employment discrimi-
nation as Congress expressly granted public entities immunity from
such judgments.61 As was true of actions under the Rehabilitation
Act, while proof of intent is not a prerequisite to equitable relief, a
plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to recover damages for
violation of the ADA.62
Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ind. 1993). In these cases, the courts entertained the
defense of qualified immunity for the defendant in his individual capacity. The Niece court noted
that "[t]here is nothing within Title II which explicitly authorizes or prohibits suits against public
actors acting in their official or individual capacities." Niece, 922 F. Supp. at 1218. However, in
ultimately deciding to hold the defendants individually liable, the court reasoned that the ADA
"is a broad, remedial statute enacted to eliminate discrimination against disabled persons" and,
therefore, "must be construed broadly to carry out its purpose." Id. at 1218-19. Similarly, in
Randolph v. Rodgers, the court noted that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act explicitly
addresses whether an individual employee could be held liable in his individual capacity. See
Randolph v. Rodgers, 980 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 (E.D. Mo. 1997), rev'd in part and vacated in part
on other grounds, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999). Interestingly, the court never made a final deci-
sion with respect to this issue. Rather, it decided the case in the alternative and held that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 1061. For a more detailed discussion of
the qualified immunity defense and the courts that have awarded it, see infra Part III.
58. Congress expressly excluded the federal government from the definition of "public en-
tity." See 42 U.S.C. § 12,131(1).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 98 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 381
("As with § 504, there is also a private right of action which includes the full panoply of reme-
dies."); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 333 (2d Cir. 1998);
Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996) (monetary damages are
available under the ADA).
60. Under Title I, plaintiffs may sue for both injunctive and monetary relief. With respect
to the monetary relief, the amount is determined by the size of the employer pursuant to the
limitations imposed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. For example, if the employer has more than
14 employees but fewer than 101 during each of 20 or more calendar weeks, the compensatory
and punitive damages cannot exceed $50,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) (1994).
61. See id.
62. See Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 674; Niece, 922 F. Supp. at 1219 n.9.
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C. Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act
The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act was originally
passed in 1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHA).63 In 1990, Congress changed the name to the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act in accordance with the modern
trend of referring to such individuals as disabled as opposed to handi-
capped. 64 Even though Congress changed the statute's name, it kept
intact the main provisions and purposes of the EAHA. The stated
purposes of the act are:
(1)(A) to ensure that all children with disabilities have available
to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes spe-
cial education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs and prepare them for employment and independent living;
(B) to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and par-
ents of such children are protected; and (C) to assist States, locali-
ties, educational service agencies, and Federal agencies to provide
for the education of all children with disabilities; (2) to assist
States in the implementation of a statewide, comprehensive, co-
ordinated, multidisciplinary, interagency system of early interven-
tion services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their
families; (3) to ensure that educators and parents have the neces-
sary tools to improve educational results for children with disabil-
ities by supporting systemic-change activities; coordinated
research and personnel preparation; coordinated technical assist-
ance, dissemination, and support; and technology development
and media services; and (4) to assess, and ensure the effectiveness
of, efforts to educate children with disabilities. 5
In passing the IDEA, Congress found that there were more than
eight million children with disabilities in the United States.66 Notably,
more than half did not receive appropriate educational services, and
at least one million were completely excluded from the public school
system.67 To realize its goal of helping disabled children, Congress re-
quires each state receiving federal financial assistance to develop a
plan under which the resident disabled children are provided with free
63. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). Before 1975, educational protections for
children with disabilities were provided by the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No.
91-230, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 175-188 (1970). See infra Part VI.B.
64. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104
Stat. 1103.
65. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
§ 101, 111 Stat. 37, 42.
66. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) (Supp. 1998), amended by Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101, 111 Stat. 37, 37-42.
67. See id.
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appropriate public education.68 The IDEA further mandates that such
education be individualized for each child.6 9
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the IDEA explicitly
provides any aggrieved party with a private cause of action to redress
violations of the statute. 70 However, this cause of action is not imme-
diately available. The IDEA requires a person claiming a deprivation
of rights to pursue and exhaust available administrative remedies
before initiating a civil suit. 71 Thus, the cause of action exists as an
appeal of a final administrative decision.
1. Potential Defendants
Since the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1990,
states have been subject to suit for violation of the IDEA.72 The cur-
68. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 60. Any state seeking to obtain federal funding pursuant to the
IDEA must submit a plan that includes goals, timetables, and descriptive information concern-
ing the facilities, personnel, and services needed to meet the goal of providing full educational
opportunities for all children with disabilities. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 61, 81-88.
69. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 83-87. To ensure that each child receives individualized educa-
tion, the Act requires the state to develop an individualized education program (IEP) for each
disabled child. The IEP is formed by a joint effort between the child's parents and the school
personnel. It describes the child's abilities and needs and prescribes a program specifically tai-
lored to the particular child's needs. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 81-88.
70. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 92.
71. See id. Before the Handicapped Children's Protection Act (HCPA) was enacted in
1986, parties tried to circumvent this exhaustion requirement by filing suits under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act or under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Neither
§ 504 nor § 1983 requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before a suit can be filed. The
HCPA precluded evasion of administrative remedies by expressly requiring parties to pursue
administrative remedies under the IDEA before instituting actions under these other statutes.
See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, §§ 2, 3, 100 Stat. 796,
796 (amended 1997). The IDEA provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and
remedies available under the Constitution, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or other Federal laws protecting the rights of chil-
dren with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking
relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and
(g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action
been brought under this subchapter.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101, 111
Stat. 37, 98. However, this provision does not establish the IDEA as the exclusive remedy for
disabled children. As the Third Circuit explained, "[w]hile section 1415(f) [to be codified as
amended as 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)] requires a party to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies
before pursuing other claims, the section makes clear that the IDEA is not the exclusive avenue
through which children with disabilities can assert claims for an appropriate education." Susan
N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 1995).
72. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 47. These amendments, which added § 1403 to the IDEA, were
passed in response to the Supreme Court's holding in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). In
Dellmuth, the Court held that states may not be sued under the IDEA because the statutory
language did "not evince an unmistakably clear intention to abrogate the State's constitutionally
secured immunity from suit." Id. at 232. Thereafter, Congress amended the statute to expressly
provide for a cause of action against the states. See Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir.
1997) (discussing the process by which Congress properly and unambiguously made states ame-
nable to suit for violations of the IDEA); Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. Supp. 940, 946 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (holding that Congress's abrogation was done properly and pursuant to a valid exercise of
its power). However, only violations that "occur in whole or in part after October 30, 1990," are
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rent version of the IDEA expressly establishes that a "State shall not
be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of this Act. 73
Section 1403 also precludes state educational agencies from seeking to
dismiss an IDEA suit on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.7 a
Local educational entities also are subject to suit for violations of the
Act. 75 Finally, actions for violation of the IDEA may be filed against
the officials of state and local agencies in their individual capacities.76
2. Remedies
The remedial provision of the IDEA, like those of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, is set forth in broad, gen-
eral terms. Specifically, the IDEA provides that a court "shall grant
such relief as the court determines is appropriate., 77 Although this
relief clause appears to be expansive and all encompassing, whether or
not damages are recoverable remains unclear.
The circuits that have addressed the availability of money dam-
ages to redress violations of the IDEA are split: the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that monetary dam-
ages may be awarded 78 while other circuits have ruled that monetary
affected by this abrogation amendment. See Joshua B. v. New Trier Township High Sch. Dist.
203, 770 F. Supp. 431, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In fact, even the most recent IDEA amendments, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat.
37, which constitute the most major overhaul since the statute's initial enactment, have been
held to apply only prospectively. See Tucker by Tucker v. Calloway County, 136 F.3d 495, 501
(6th Cir. 1998); see also Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. by Barry F., 118 F.3d
245, 247 n.1 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 690 (1998). The courts have found that this
approach "is consistent with the 'presumption against retroactive legislation that is deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence."' Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997)). For a more
detailed discussion about the most recent IDEA amendments, see infra Part IV.C.
73. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
§ 101, 111 Stat. 37, 47 (1997). This provision has been found to constitute a valid waiver of the
states' llth Amendment immunity by two district courts and at least one circuit court, all of
which have held that Congress abrogated the states' 11th Amendment immunity pursuant to a
valid exercise of its power under section five of the 14th Amendment. See Marie 0., 131 F.3d at
617; Emma C., 985 F. Supp. at 946-47.
74. See Gary A. v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986); Joshua
B., 770 F. Supp. at 433-34. A state educational agency is "the State board of education or other
agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secon-
dary schools." § 101, 111 Stat. at 46.
75. The statute defines local educational agency as "a public board of education or other
public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction
of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county,
township, school district or other political subdivision of a State." § 101, 111 Stat. at 44-45.
76. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493-94 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Christopher P. by
Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 799 (2d Cir. 1990). See generally P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d
1033 (2d Cir. 1990); Doe by Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986); Mason v. Schenec-
tady City Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). Officials of these agencies include indi-
viduals serving in such positions as superintendents, principals, and officers of state boards.
77. § 101, 111 Stat. at 92.
78. See W.B., 67 F.3d at 494.
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damages are not generally recoverable under the IDEA. 79 Even the
circuits that generally reject the remedy of money damages, however,
have acknowledged that damages might be available in exceptional
circumstances. According to these courts, a monetary award may be
justified when the school official failed to provide services to protect
the health of the child and when the defendant "has acted in bad faith
by failing to comply with the procedural provisions of [the IDEA] in
an egregious fashion."80
Of even greater significance is the fact that most of the decisions
disallowing damages were rendered before the Supreme Court de-
cided Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.81 As previously
mentioned,8 in Franklin the Supreme Court promulgated the general
rule that "absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the fed-
eral courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cogni-
zable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.,
83
Accordingly, where the pre-Franklin courts began with the presump-
tion that monetary relief was not available, courts in the post-Franklin
era presume that all remedies are available.' Therefore, although the
circuits are split as to the availability of money damages, there is rea-
sonable support for the assertion that courts are presently more in-
clined to hold that money damages are available for violations of the
IDEA.85
Even courts holding that money damages are available under the
IDEA have limited the amount recoverable. Concern over exposing
school districts and officials to exorbitant financial liabilities as well as
fear of discouraging educators from trying innovative teaching meth-
ods and programs have prompted courts to consider compensatory
79. See Sellers v. School Bd. of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 526-27 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 168 (1998); Charlie F. v. Board of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989,
991 (7th Cir. 1996); Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983);
Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081 (11th Cir. 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th
Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1206 (7th Cir. 1981); Mountain View-Los
Altos Union High Sch. Dist. v. Sharron B.H., 709 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1983).
80. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1213-14; see also Miener, 673 F.2d at 980; Barwacz v. Michigan
Dep't of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 1296, 1307 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Gerasimou by Gerasimou v.
Ambach, 636 F. Supp. 1504, 1512 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
81. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
82. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71.
84. In reaching the conclusion that money damages may be secured for violations of the
IDEA, the Third Circuit started with the Supreme Court's Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
School presumption that, absent any congressional intent to the contrary, all appropriate relief is
available. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995) (relying on Franklin, 503 U.S. at
66). After examining the text and legislative history and finding nothing indicating a congres-
sional desire to limit the relief available under the IDEA, the Third Circuit found that monetary
damages were recoverable. See id. at 494-95; see also Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. Supp. 940, 943-
45 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
85. It is the courts that have sanctioned awards of damages that have also accepted quali-
fied immunity as a defense. See infra Part III.C.
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forms of relief other than a general award of damages. As the Third
Circuit advised:
[I]n fashioning a remedy for an IDEA violation, a district court
'may wish to order educational services, such as compensatory ed-
ucation beyond a child's age of eligibility, or reimbursement for
providing at private expense what should have been offered by
the school, rather than compensatory damages for generalized
pain and suffering.86
Accordingly, both compensatory education87 and retroactive reim-
bursement 88 are available under the IDEA. Additionally, the IDEA
explicitly provides that a prevailing party is entitled to attorney's
fees.89
In sum, the courts generally have construed the Acts to extend a
cause of action for damages against individual public officials who in-
tentionally discriminate against the disabled in violation of these Acts.
The same courts, however, have undermined the damage remedy by
allowing officials sued for discrimination to invoke a qualified immu-
nity defense.
III. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS HAVE MISTAKENLY
PERMITTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO ASSERT A QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
DEFENSE IN ACTIONS SEEKING DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION
OF THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
None of the Acts textually prescribe an immunity defense for
public officials who are sued for damages under the Acts. Nor does
the United States Constitution confer a blanket grant of immunity
86. W.B., 67 F.3d at 495.
87. Several courts have found that compensatory education is an available and appropriate
remedy for IDEA violations. See Board of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist.
200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1996); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d
865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990); Miener v.. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 1986). An award of
compensatory education obliges a school district to provide education past an individual's 21st
birthday, even though the IDEA requires that appropriate education be provided only until age
21, in an attempt to cure any past deprivation. The standard generally followed in awarding
compensatory education is based on the belief that
a school district that knows or should know that a child has an inappropriate [Individual
Education Plan] or is not receiving more than a de minimis educational benefit must correct
the situation. If it fails to do so, a disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a
period equal to the period of deprivation ....
M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996).
88. In School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 359 (1985), the Supreme Court held that district courts have the power to compel school
authorities to reimburse parents for private special education if the court determines that the
private facility was an appropriate placement. See id. at 369-70. In determining the amount of
reimbursement to which a plaintiff is entitled, the Supreme Court has indicated that the district
courts have "broad discretion" in calculating relief. See id. at 369.
89. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
17, § 101, 111 Stat. 37, 92-93; see also Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ., 1 F. Supp. 2d 111,
114-15 (D.P.R. 1998) (discussing the availability of and the standards for determining the appro-
priate amount of attorney's fees to be awarded).
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upon government officials.9" Nevertheless, the lower federal courts
have uniformly allowed individual public officials who are sued for
damages for intentionally discriminating on account of disability to
evade liability by asserting the defense of qualified immunity. 91
A. Qualified Immunity Under the Rehabilitation Act
The first case to endorse qualified immunity under the Rehabili-
tation Act was Clouser v. City of Thornton.92 In Clouser, the plaintiff
complained that he was discharged from his position as administrative
assistant to the Thornton city manager because of a hearing impair-
ment. Clouser sought compensatory and punitive damages from the
city manager and the city finance director. 93
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was inapplicable because the plaintiff
was fired from a job in a city department that had not received federal
funds. Plaintiff responded that his job as an administrative assistant
required that he use computer equipment that the city had purchased
or leased with federal monies.94 Without resolving whether there was
a sufficient nexus between the department where plaintiff worked and
the city's receipt of federal funds, the court granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment. Because it was not clearly established
whether such a funding link was sufficient to trigger the protections of
the Rehabilitation Act, the court ruled, the defendants were as a mat-
ter of law entitled to judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.95
The Clouser court never explained its justification for allowing a
qualified immunity defense under the Rehabilitation Act. Moreover,
the court did not assess whether immunity could be squared with the
language or legislative history of the Act. Rather the court assumed,
90. The only immunity embodied in the Constitution is the Speech and Debate Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, which provides in pertinent part, "for any Speech or Debate in
either House, [senators and representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
91. Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense which the defendant offi-
cial must plead. It is based on the notion that "where an official's duties legitimately require
action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken 'with independence and without fear of consequences."' Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)); see, e.g.,
Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1343 (4th Cir. 1995); Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (8th
Cir. 1994); McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 862 (5th Cir. 1993);
P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1990); Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 672-
73 (11th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Qualified immunity is not available in suits against
governmental entities, but is limited to claims against government employees in their individual
capacities. The immunity is further restricted to actions for damages and is not available as a
defense to equitable relief. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975). At least one
court has held that qualified immunity may be asserted by private individuals sued under the
disability discrimination statutes. See Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644-45 (E.D. Mich.
1998).
92. 676 F. Supp. 228 (D. Colo. 1987).
93. See id. at 229.
94. See id. at 231.
95. See id. at 232.
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without analysis, that the qualified immunity available to government
officials sued under § 1983-an unrelated statute passed over a cen-
tury before the Rehabilitation Act-applied equally to city employees
sued under § 504.96
Subsequent federal court of appeals and district court cases per-
petuated the reflexive extension of the § 1983 qualified immunity de-
fense to actions under the Rehabilitation Act.97 The lone case to even
consider the propriety of according a qualified immunity defense
under the Rehabilitation Act was Lue v. Moore.98 Lue arose out of a
blind Missouri inmate's claim that prison officials had violated § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act by denying him access to vocational pro-
grams. The court began its immunity analysis by observing that both
parties assumed that the defense was available under the Act.99 The
court then reasoned that while the Rehabilitation Act does not textu-
ally designate immunity as a defense, four other courts of appeals had
applied qualified immunity to actions for damages under the Rehabili-
tation Act.10 Of course, as just analyzed, none of these courts of ap-
peals had considered whether immunity was justified under the
language or legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, but merely
extrapolated immunity from § 1983. The Lue court likewise looked
solely to § 1983, interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald'01 as suggesting "qualified immunity should normally be
available in civil damages lawsuits unless Congress has stated
otherwise."102
In sum, qualified immunity under the Rehabilitation Act is not
founded upon the language or legislative history of the act. Rather,
immunity derives entirely from the stated, or in most cases unstated,
thesis that the immunity accorded officials sued under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 presumptively applies across the board to govern-
ment officials who violate any federal statute.
96. See id.
97. See Stigall v. Lewis, No. 97-5301, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4708, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar. 16,
1999); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1998); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d
907, 914-16 (8th Cir. 1998); Allison v. Department of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir.
1996); Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1355 (4th Cir. 1995); McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ.
Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 862-63 (5th Cir. 1993); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041-42
(2d Cir. 1990); Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 670 n.10 (11th Cir. 1990); Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 640, 649-50 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Randolph v. Rodgers, 980 F. Supp. 1051, 1061 (E.D. Mo.
1997); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1145-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998); Timmons v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 887 F. Supp. 576, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F.
Supp. 1126, 1137-38 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Mackey v. Cleveland State Univ., 837 F. Supp. 1396, 1410-
13 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
98. 43 F.3d 1203 (8th Cir. 1994).
99. See id. at 1205.
100. See id.
101. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
102. Lue, 43 F.3d at 1205.
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B. Immunity Under Title II of the ADA
As was true of actions under the Rehabilitation Act, the courts
have mechanically incorporated § 1983 immunities into claims for
damages against individual government officials under the ADA. 10 3
No court has explored whether the defense is compatible with the lan-
guage or legislative history of the ADA. The only semblance of an
explanation arose in the district court's opinion in Gorman v.
Bishop."0 4 Plaintiff Gorman, a paraplegic, sued the chief of police for
damages for injuries suffered while Gorman was transported to a po-
lice station in a van that was not equipped with a wheelchair lift or
wheelchair restraints. In considering Gorman's action under the
ADA, the district court commenced its analysis by observing that be-
cause the ADA was based upon the Rehabilitation Act, cases under
the Rehabilitation Act are instructive in construing the ADA."'5 Cit-
ing to Lue v. Moore,"° the district court offered that "[f]or the same
reasons that [defendant Chief of Police] Bishop would be entitled to
assert a defense of qualified immunity with respect to claims under the
Rehabilitation Act ...Bishop is entitled to raise the defense with
respect to the ADA claim."10 7 The district court concluded that be-
cause the ADA's relevance to the manner in which disabled persons
are to be transported following an arrest was not clear as of the date
of the incident, the chief of police was entitled to summary judgment
on the ground of qualified immunity."0 8
103. See Stigall v. Lewis, No. 97-5301, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4708, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar. 16,
1999); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1998); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d
907, 914-16 (8th Cir. 1998); Allison v. Department of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir.
1996); Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1355 (4th Cir. 1995); Demilo-Fytros v. City of Mt.
Vernon, 993 F. Supp. 221, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649-50
(E.D. Mich. 1998); Key v. Grayson, No. 96-40166, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3412, at *17-18 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 16, 1998); Hall v. Thomas, No. H-97-874, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2956, at *13 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 15, 1998); Rouse v. Plantier, 987 F. Supp. 302, 316 (D.N.J. 1997); Randolph v. Rodgers,
980 F. Supp. 1051, 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 970
F. Supp. 1094, 1145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998);
Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp. 809, 820 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Fowler v. Gomez, No. C94-
2679 FMS, 1995 WL 779,128, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1995); Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp.
476, 487-88 (N.D. Ind. 1993). These courts simply assumed that the immunity defense was avail-
able and inquired only into whether the defendant satisfied the elements of the defense.
104. 919 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Mo. 1996), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Gorman v.
Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).
105. See Gorman, 919 F. Supp. at 328; see also Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191,
197 (4th Cir. 1997); Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 1996); Easley v.
Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1994). As the court stated in Hanson v. Sangamon County
Sheriffs Department, "'The Rehabilitation Act is materially identical to and the model for the
ADA, except that it is limited to programs that receive federal financial assistance.'" 991 F.
Supp. 1059, 1062 n.2 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (quoting Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d
481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997)).
106. 43 F.3d 1203 (8th Cir. 1994).
107. Gorman, 919 F. Supp. at 328.
108. See id. at 331-32.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of qualified immunity.10 9 The court of appeals did not
inquire whether qualified immunity is available in actions under the
ADA but assumed the applicability of the defense. Applying the stan-
dard developed for suits under § 1983, the court of appeals agreed
that defendants were immune because their conduct did not violate
clearly established rights under the ADA. a1 °
To the extent that the district court's reasoning in Gorman accu-
rately depicts the origin of the immunity defense in suits under the
ADA, qualified immunity is not grounded in an interpretation of the
text or legislative history of the ADA. Instead, qualified immunity
under the ADA is descended from immunity under the Rehabilitation
Act, which in turn is founded solely in the immunity granted to offi-
cials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
C. The IDEA
Like the courts entertaining suits for damages under the Rehabil-
itation Act and the ADA, the courts that have sanctioned damage ac-
tions against public officials for violation of the IDEA have assumed
that immunity under § 1983 is equally available to public officials sued
under the IDEA. No court has probed whether the defense is sup-
ported by the language or legislative history of the IDEA.11' Rather,
the courts presumed that the defense was available and inquired only
into whether the rights were clearly established and, if so, whether it
was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that their ac-
tions did not violate those rights.11 2
In short, the courts adjudicating damage claims under the Reha-
bilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA have blindly cloned the § 1983 quali-
fied immunity defense without considering whether the defense is
consonant with Congress's intent. The courts bestowing qualified im-
munity upon individual governmental officials sued for damages
under the disability discrimination statutes have neglected to address
three fundamental questions concerning the availability of the de-
fense. First, can the defense be reconciled with the absence of any
reference to qualified immunity in the language of the Acts? Second,
does the legislative history reveal that although failing to specify qual-
ified immunity as a defense in the language of the Acts, Congress
nonetheless intended that the courts recognize the defense? Third, did
109. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).
110. See id. at 914-16.
111. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 499 (3d Cir. 1995); Mason v. Schenectady City Sch.
Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215, 221 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
112. See P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1990); see also W.B., 67 F.3d at
499; Christopher P. by Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990); Doe by Gonzales v.
Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1495 (9th Cir. 1986); C.M. v. Board of Pub. Educ. of Henderson County,
No. 1:98CV66, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 868, at *13-15 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 1999).
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Congress ordain that defenses it legislated over a century earlier for
actions under § 1983 were to become part and parcel of the Rehabili-
tation Act, the ADA, and the IDEA? The answer to each of these
questions is a resounding "no."
IV. PROPERLY CONSTRUED, THE TEXTS OF THE DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES PRECLUDE AN
IMMUNITY DEFENSE
It is a long-settled "canon of statutory construction that the start-
ing point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute it-
self." '1 13 The Supreme Court has espoused the general proposition that
the language of a statute must be regarded as conclusive unless Con-
gress has unequivocally expressed a contradictory legislative intent.114
Absent rare and exceptional circumstances, judicial inquiry ordinarily
should end at the unambiguous text of the statute.1 5
Congress did not include any provision in the text of the Rehabil-
itation Act, the ADA, or the IDEA directly or indirectly prescribing a
qualified immunity defense to exonerate government officials who in-
tentionally discriminate in violation of the unequivocal guarantees of
the statutes. Under the clearly established principle of statutory con-
struction, absent a textual conferral of immunity, qualified immunity
should not be entertained as a defense to excuse violations of the
Acts.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed that the unambiguous lan-
guage of a statute is dispositive in interpreting the ADA. In Penn-
sylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,116 the Court held that
the protections of the ADA extend to inmates in state prisons. The
Court rejected the state's assertion that the ADA should be inter-
preted to preserve the sovereign power of the state absent "an 'unmis-
takably clear' expression of intent to 'alter the usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal Government.'"117 It rea-
soned that the language of the ADA unmistakably extends to state
prisons because the definition of "public entity" in Title II embodies
state institutions and, of equal importance, does not include any ex-
ceptions. The Court similarly relied upon the plain text of the ADA to
rebuff the state's contention that the ADA was ambiguous as to
whether a state prisoner is a "qualified individual with a disability."' 18
113. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see
also United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356 (1994); Mallard v. United States Dis-
trict Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989).
114. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 108.
115. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992); Freytag v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991); United States ex reL LaCorte v.
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 1998).
116. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
117. Id. at 1954 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991)).
118. Id. at 1955.
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Finally, the Court declined the state's urging to look beyond the text
of the statute to consider the fact that prisons and prisoners are not
mentioned in the ADA's statement of findings and purposes. Even if
Congress did not envision that the ADA would extend to state pris-
ons, the Court opined, "in the context of an unambiguous statutory
text, that is irrelevant.... [T]he fact that a statute can be 'applied in
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." 119 Under this same reasoning,
because the text of the disability discrimination statutes unambigu-
ously makes no reference to immunity, qualified immunity may not be
asserted as a defense.
The fact that Congress expressly granted individual immunity in
other federal statutes further confirms that qualified immunity may
not be raised as a defense where Congress failed to prescribe immu-
nity in the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA. As the court of ap-
peals acknowledged in In re Haas, "[w]here Congress knows how to
say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling."'120
Immunity is neither a novel nor an innovative concept. In draft-
ing modern federal statutes, Congress has made apparent its intent to
impart immunity. In some statutes Congress has shown its intent
through explicit use of the word "immunity." For example, Congress
expressly prescribed the "immunity of officers or employees of the
government" 121 in 40 U.S.C. § 489 and "immunity for good faith re-
porting and associated actions' 1 22 in 42 U.S.C.A. § 13,031. Even in
statutes that do not explicitly include the word "immunity," Congress,
through alternate language, has unambiguously articulated its intent
to immunize an individual government employee. Congress provided
immunity to officials of the Tennessee Valley Authority by the follow-
ing terms:
An action against the Tennessee Valley Authority for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting
from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Tennessee Valley Authority while acting within the scope
of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim. Any other civil action or proceeding arising out of or relat-
119. Id. at 1956 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
120. 48 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir. 1995).
121. The statute provides:
Where any property is transferred or disposed of in accordance with this Act and any regu-
lations prescribed hereunder, no officer or employee of the Government shall (1) be liable
with respect to such transfer or disposition except for his own fraud, or (2) be accountable
for the collection of any purchase price for such property which is determined to be uncol-
lectible by the Federal agency responsible therefor.
40 U.S.C. § 489(a) (1994).
122. The statute provides: "All persons who ... make a [child abuse] report ... shall be
immune from civil and criminal liability arising out of such actions." 42 U.S.C. § 13,031(f) (1994).
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ing to the same subject matter against the employee or his estate
is precluded ....
Congress also granted immunity to members of professional review
boards by stating, "If a professional review action.., of a professional
review body meets all the standards specified ...[any person con-
nected with such review] shall not be liable in damages under any law
of the United States." '124 It is plain that at the time it passed the disa-
bility discrimination statutes, Congress was well aware of how to im-
munize government employees were it inclined to do so. The lack of
an express grant of qualified immunity in the text of the Acts
manifests Congress's intent to bar any immunity defense.
None of the courts that endorsed qualified immunity under the
Acts examined the text of the Acts. Had the courts conferring immu-
nity considered the language of the disability discrimination statutes
under the governing rules of statutory interpretation, they would have
been obliged to hold that no qualified immunity defense was avail-
able. Such was the reasoning employed in Samuel v. Holmes,"a5 where
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
claim of qualified immunity posited by school officials sued under the
Federal False Claims Act (FCA). 126
Samuel arose out of the dismissal of plaintiff from his position as
an internal auditor for the Orleans Parish School District. Averring
that he was fired in retaliation for reporting that the school district
had overcharged the federal government in violation of the FCA,
plaintiff sued the superintendent and five members of the school
board for damages. 127 Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
redress the denial of procedural and substantive due process and also
123. 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2(a)(1) (1994).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 11,111(a)(1) (1994). While generally immunizing members of professional
review boards, Congress specified that such immunity did not extend to damage actions "under
any law of the United States or any state relating to the civil rights of any person or persons." Id.
Similarly, the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act amended the
Federal Tort Claims Act by substituting the United States as the sole defendant in cases where a
federal employee, acting within the scope of his or her employment, is sued for negligence. See
28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 100-700 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945.
The Act thereby immunizes federal employees for negligent acts carried out within the scope of
their employment. See id. As is true of the immunity granted to members of professional review
boards, immunity granted to federal officials by the Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act does not extend to a civil action against an employee of the government
"which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action
against an individual is otherwise authorized." § 2679(b)(2)(B). U.S. Representative Frank
noted, "we made it very clear in this bill that nothing in this bill takes away any right an individ-
ual might have had to sue an individual Federal employee under any other statute .... Other
remedies under other acts, Civil Rights Act, are not affected at all." 134 CONG. REc. H4719
(daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frank). The fact that Congress has specifically with-
drawn immunity for claims involving civil rights in two instances where it has expressly conferred
immunity makes it particularly improbable that Congress meant to silently provide immunity to
public officials who trammel the civil rights of the disabled.
125. 138 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1998).




asserted that his firing offended the antiretaliation provisions of the
FCA.1 28
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims on
the ground of qualified immunity. On the § 1983 claim, the trial court
granted the motion as to the school board members because they had
relied upon the written recommendation of the superintendent, but
denied the motion as to the superintendent. The court also denied the
motion as to all defendants on the FCA claim, however, because the
parties could not proffer any authority that qualified immunity was
available as a defense to damage actions for violation of the FCA.12 9
Defendants took an interlocutory appeal from the denial of sum-
mary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit ac-
knowledged that a qualified immunity defense could be raised to the
count invoking rights under § 1983.130 The court of appeals further
held, however, that qualified immunity could not be asserted as a de-
fense to the separate claim under the FCA. The court of appeals com-
menced its analysis by scrutinizing the language of the FCA. It
concluded that because the FCA was silent on the existence of quali-
fied immunity, the local officials could not propound the defense. 31
Thus the Samuel court applied the fundamental canon of statutory
construction that has been ignored by every court that has accepted
immunity under the disability discrimination statutes: where a statute
is silent on the question of immunity, no immunity exists.
The Samuels court further reasoned that qualified immunity was
contrary to Congress's aims in enacting the FCA-to discourage fraud
against the government and to encourage those with knowledge to
report the wrongdoing. 132 As will next be discussed, qualified immu-
nity is likewise inconsistent with the legislative history of the Rehabili-
tation Act, the ADA, and the IDEA.
128. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1994). The statute provides:
(h) Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in
any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his
or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employer or
others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation
of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be
entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include rein-
statement with the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the discrimi-
nation, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any
special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee may bring an action in the appropriate district
court of the United States for the relief provided in this subsection.
Plaintiff also averred that his firing contravened the protections of the Louisiana whistle-blower
statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1169(A)-(C) (West 1997). See Samuel, 138 F.3d at 175.
129. See Samuel, 138 F.3d at 175.
130. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's denial of the superintendent's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Under clearly established law, the superintendent's conduct was not
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V. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES CONFIRMS THAT QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY Is NOT AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE
While Congress's failure to prescribe qualified immunity in the
disability discrimination statutes should be regarded as conclusive of
its intent, the legislative history of the Acts corroborates that Con-
gress did not intend to exonerate government officials who intention-
ally discriminate on the basis of disability.133 To the contrary,
Congress instructed that the Acts are to be liberally construed to af-
ford relief to victims of discrimination.
A. The Rehabilitation Act
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act reveals that Con-
gress intended to supply disabled individuals with broad legal reme-
dies should their statutory rights be violated by individuals and
entities receiving federal funds. Congress has progressively expanded
the scope and reach of the Rehabilitation Act to afford greater reme-
dies and to widen the class of defendants subjected to liability. In its
original form, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not include any rem-
edy for those aggrieved within the meaning of the act. 34 In 1978, Con-
gress amended the act in three major ways. First, it created a private
right of action against the federal government. 35 Second, it provided
133. Typically, courts will consider the legislative history of a statute when the language of
that statute is in any way ambiguous. See Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1559
(11th Cir. 1989) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)); see also In re Fairfield Com-
munities, Inc., 990 F.2d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 1993). Justice Scalia's "New Textualism" approach,
however, rejects the notion that legislative history should be used to help interpret a statute's
meaning. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (agreeing with the holding except to extent that it relied on legislative history); Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that state-
ments of a handful of legislators in Congress should not determine the meaning of the statute's
text); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that pre-
ratification materials such as floor debates and committee reports are irrelevant when interpret-
ing plain text); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that consideration of legislative history is unnecessary when a statute's text is susceptible to
independent construction by the Court). Under this approach, statutory interpretation focuses
almost exclusively on the plain meaning of the statute's text, supplemented by consideration of
the text of related statutes, and by consideration of the traditional canons of statutory construc-
tion. See William D. Poppin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Inter-
pretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1133-40 (1992). Although Justice Scalia's New Textualism
approach gained support from the Court during the 1980s, this support has waned throughout
the 1990s. Only Justice Thomas has remained consistently faithful to the approach. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
Thomas, J.) ("The Court attempts to minimize the amendment's harshness..., quoting some
post-legislation legislative history (another oxymoron) to show that, despite the uncontested
plain meaning of the statute, Congress never meant it to apply .... ").
134. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394.
135. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982-83. In Lane v. Pena, the Supreme
Court held that the amendment did not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity
against awards of damages. See 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
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that the remedies available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 were available to any person who had been aggrieved under
§ 504.136 Third, it permitted the prevailing party to recover attorneys'
fees at the discretion of the court.1 37
In its 1986 amendment of the Rehabilitation Act, Congress evi-
denced its intent that the Act be liberally construed to afford relief in
the event of discrimination against the disabled. The 1986 amendment
was enacted as a direct response to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 138 which held that Congress had
not abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits
brought pursuant to § 504.139 Congress in turn passed Public Law 99-
506, amending the Rehabilitation Act to include a provision expressly
stating that states shall not be immune from suit in federal court under
the Eleventh Amendment for violations of the Act. 4 ° Speaking in
support of the amendment, Senator Cranston echoed the importance
of the damage remedy to the enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act:
[A]s the result of Atascadero injunctive relief is now the only re-
lief available in Federal court against a state agency for a viola-
tion of section 504 . . . . [L]itigation involving a claim of
discrimination often takes years to resolve. Thus, where the dis-
abled person is seeking employment or trying to pursue an educa-
tion or participate in a project having only a 2- or 3-year life, an
injunction may come too late to be of value in remedying the
harm done through the unlawful discrimination. In a very real
sense, the availability of only injunctive relief postpones the effec-
tive date of the antidiscrimination law, with respect to a State
agency, to the date on which the court issues an injunction be-
cause there is no remedy for violations occurring before that
date.' 4 '
Senator Cranston pointed out that Congress provided no exemptions
from damages for violation of the Rehabilitation Act: "Congress cre-
ated a right of action in Federal or State court to remedy violations of
section 504-with no exception in the law either from the States or for
any particular type of remedy, such as money damages.' 142 By ex-
136. See § 120(a), 92 Stat. at 2982-83.
137. See id.
138. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Atascadero, a divided Court announced that Congress would
not be deemed to have exercised its authority to waive the states' immunity under the 11th
Amendment unless it unequivocally expressed its intent in the unmistakable language of the
statute. See id. at 242-44. Because Congress had not expressly abrogated the states' immunity in
the text of § 504, the Court held suit could not be brought against the states in federal court. See
id.
139. See id. at 242-44.
140. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807,
1845, which states in part: "A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ......
141. CONG. REC. S15,104-05 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
142. Id. at S15,104.
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pressly abrogating the states' immunity, the 1986 legislation reinforced
the intent of Congress that the Rehabilitation Act be broadly con-
strued to hold accountable all persons and entities that discriminate
against the disabled.
Congress again widened the scope of § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act in 1988. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court held
that the term "program or activity," as employed in § 504, prohibited
discrimination only in the specific individual program or activity that
received the federal funding rather than the entire institution to which
the program or activity belonged. 143 Because the college received fed-
eral money only for student aid, the Court concluded that the finan-
cial aid office alone was subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of
federal law. In response to the Supreme Court's cabining the scope of
§ 504, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act.144 This Act
amended § 504 by expanding the meaning of "program or activity" to
make clear that discrimination would be prohibited on an institution-
wide basis. 45 The Senate report emphasized that the Supreme Court's
narrow construction of "program or activity" was inconsistent with
Congress's general intent as to how the Rehabilitation Act was to be
interpreted:
In enacting the four civil rights statutes [Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975], Congress intended that each be
broadly interpreted to provide effective remedies against
discrimination....
When Congress enacted Title VI, it emphasized the breadth
of its coverage. . . . Indeed, both proponents and opponents
agreed that the prohibition of discrimination would be a broad
one ....
... Just a year after passage of Section 504, Congress clearly
expressed the view that prohibition against discrimination in-
cluded in Section 504 was to be read as broadly as that included
in Title VI.
The inescapable conclusion is that Congress intended that ti-
tle [sic] VI as well as its progeny-Title IX, Section 504 and the
ADA-be given the broadest interpretation.146
143. 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984).
144. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29-30 (1988).
145. See § 4, 102 Stat. at 29-30. In the debates surrounding the amendment, Senator Ken-
nedy said, "[S]o I hope that in the future, when the Supreme Court considers crucial issues such
as this, the justices will try harder to decipher the intent of Congress instead of taking the judicial
path of least resistance by telling the legislative branch to try again." 134 CONG. REC. S2731
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
146. S. REP. No. 100-64, at 5-7, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7-9.
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Consistent with the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, the
courts have acknowledged that "[S]ection 504, as [a] remedial statute[
], should be broadly and liberally construed. 147
B. The ADA
The legislative history of the ADA likewise mandates a broad
construction of the Act. Passed in 1990, the ADA was the "final proc-
lamation that the disabled will never again be excluded, never again
treated by law as second-class citizens. ' 148 Congress thought that
through the passage of the Act, "43 million Americans with disabili-
ties [would] gain freedom, dignity, opportunity-their civil rights. 149
Regarded as "the greatest expansion of civil rights protection since
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,"15 the ADA should be liberally interpreted
to protect individuals covered under the Act.
Despite the fact that it already had enlarged the remedies af-
forded the disabled through three amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act, Congress envisioned the ADA as carving an even wider swath,
safeguarding those individuals who were not afforded relief under the
Rehabilitation Act. As Senator Durenberger noted:
Eighteen years ago, when Congress was debating the Rehabilita-
tion Act here, the then senior Senator from Minnesota, Herbert
Humphrey said, "The time... has come when we can no longer
tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America .... These
people have the right to live, to work to the best of their ability,
to know the dignity to which every human being is entitled."...
[it is time to complete the work we began . . . by opening all
aspects of life-employment, public accommodations, public
services, transportation, and telecommunications for persons with
disabilities. The ADA is that step forward, giving people with dis-
abilities the assurances that there is a future in this country for
persons with disabilities. 51
The ADA was designed to finish the task begun by the Rehabilitation
Act by providing a "clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. '152
147. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981).
148. 136 CONG. REC. S9684 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. McCain). Senator
Harkin, the major sponsor of the ADA, proclaimed "The ADA is, indeed, the 20th century
Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities. Today, the U.S. Senate will say to all
Americans that the days of segregation and inequality are over .... " Id. at S9689.
149. Id. at S9685 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
150. Id. at S9688 (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
151. Id.
152. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,304. The
section of the House Report concerning enforcement of the ADA noted that "[s]everal wit-
nesses emphasized that the rights guaranteed by the ADA are meaningless without effective
enforcement provisions." Id. at 322.
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The United States Supreme Court has approved "the familiar ca-
non of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be con-
strued broadly to effectuate its purposes." '153 The lower federal courts
have applied this canon to the ADA, instructing in accordance with its
legislative history that as a "broad, remedial statute enacted to elimi-
nate discrimination against disabled persons," the ADA "must be in-
terpreted broadly to carry out its purpose. "154
C. The IDEA
The legislative history of the IDEA also mandates a broad ap-
proach to protection of the disabled. As will be discussed more thor-
oughly later,155 the IDEA is the culmination of twenty-five years of
congressional enactments progressively expanding the substantive and
procedural protections afforded disabled children and their families.
The Senate report to the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, the precursor to the IDEA, emphasized that the Act was
designed to create enforceable rights to ensure equal educational op-
portunity for disabled children:
This Nation has long embraced a philosophy that the right to a
free appropriate public education is basic to equal opportunity
and is vital to secure the future and prosperity of our people. It is
contradictory to that philosophy when that right is not assured
equally to all groups of people within the Nation. Certainly the
failure to provide a right to education to handicapped children
cannot be allowed to continue.
... Congress must take a more active role under its responsi-
bility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handi-
capped children are provided equal educational opportunity. It
can no longer be the policy of the Government to merely estab-
lish an unenforceable goal requiring all children to be in school.
S.6 takes positive necessary steps to ensure that the rights of chil-
dren and their parents are protected.156
In 1990, Congress expanded the relief available to the disabled
when it expressly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
153. Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
154. Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1218-19 (E.D. Mich. 1996); see also Anderson v.
Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 771 (E.D. Tex. 1996) ("Unlike other legislation
designed to settle narrow issues of law, the ADA has a comprehensive reach and should be
interpreted with this goal in mind."); Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp.
488, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses."); Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir.
1993) ("The ADA is a remedial statute, designed to eliminate discrimination against the disabled
in all facets of society. As a remedial statute it must be broadly construed to effectuate its
purposes.").
155. See infra notes 178-96 and accompanying text.
156. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433.
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nity from suits in federal court under the IDEA.'57 The abrogation of
the states' immunity is perhaps the most significant indicator of Con-
gress's intent to afford generous remedies under the IDEA, as it was
riposte to the Supreme Court's narrowing of the relief available under
the IDEA in Dellmuth v. Muth.'58 In Dellmuth, the Court held that
parents who paid for the appropriate placement of children who had
been wrongly denied their guaranteed free appropriate public educa-
tion could not recover the tuition payments from the states.159 Con-
gress "determined that the Supreme Court misinterpreted
Congressional intent" and that "[s]uch a gap in coverage was never
intended."' 6 ° The House committee acknowledged that "it would be
inequitable for [the IDEA] to mandate State compliance with its pro-
visions and yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in Fed-
eral courts when State or State agency actions are at issue."'' Under
the 1990 amendment, "[i]n a suit against a State for a violation of this
Act, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are
available for such violations to the same extent as remedies are avail-
able for any violation in a suit against public entities other than a
State."162
Amending the IDEA evidences congressional intent to make the
rights granted meaningful by ensuring remedies for violations of the
Act. 16 3 Consistent with the expressed goal of guaranteeing equal edu-
157. See H.R. REP. No. 101-544, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1724.
158. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
159. See id. at 232.




163. The most recent IDEA amendments were passed in 1997. The major provisions of the
1997 amendments concern the ability of schools to discipline disabled students for behavior not
related to their disability in the same way as they discipline children without disabilities; the
inability of schools to dismiss or cut-off educational services to disabled children for bad conduct,
no matter how extreme; the new federal fund allocation formulas based on a combination of
school-age population and district poverty rates; the policy that a public agency such as a school
is not required to pay for special education and related services at a private school if that agency
made a free appropriate public education available to the child; and the new rule that does not
require school districts to pay the fees of attorneys who represent the parents of disabled stu-
dents in meetings that involve the student's individualized educational plan, unless the meetings
are held by a court or administrative order. The goal of these amendments was to "place greater
emphasis on improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive
a quality public education." Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). Specifically, the purposes of the 1997 amendments
were to:
" Preserve the right of children with disabilities to a free appropriate public education;
" Promote improved educational results for children with disabilities through early inter-
vention, preschool, and educational experiences that prepare them for later educational
challenges and employment;
" Expand and promote opportunities for parents, special education, related services, regu-
lar education, and early intervention service providers, and other personnel to work in
new partnerships at both the State and local levels;
" Create incentives to enhance the capacity of schools and other community-based entities
to work effectively with children with disabilities and their families, through targeted
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cational opportunity to disabled children, the courts have broadly and
liberally construed the IDEA.16 4
D. Qualified Immunity Is Inconsistent with the Legislative History
of the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA
The legislative instruction that the Acts be broadly construed to
afford relief to victims of disability discrimination obviously repudi-
ates a qualified immunity defense that does not appear on the face of
the statutes. Rather than promote relief, the qualified immunity de-
fense deprives the victim of a damage remedy against the government
official who intentionally engaged in the proscribed discrimination on
the basis of disability. In fact, in two circumstances the immunity de-
fense would have the effect of entirely barring recovery of the dam-
ages caused by intentional discrimination.
First, because damages may not be obtained from the federal gov-
ernment under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA,165 a disabled per-
son would be left without compensation for harms suffered as a
consequence of intentional discrimination caused by a federal official
who successfully asserts the qualified immunity defense. Second, im-
munity may have the effect of precluding recovery of damages for dis-
criminatory acts of state and local officials. Although state and local
governmental entities are not sheltered by any immunity, the courts
may require that plaintiff prove that the discrimination was inflicted
pursuant to a governmental custom or policy before the entity will be
held liable.166 If the discriminatory acts of a public official do not rep-
resent governmental custom or policy, the entity may not be liable. If
at the same time the state or local official is exonerated under the
qualified immunity defense, the risk of loss from violations of the disa-
bility discrimination statutes will be borne by the least appropriate
party, the victim of discrimination. Congress has repeatedly made
plain its intent that the Acts should be construed, without exception,
to afford relief when public officials discriminate against the disabled.
Because qualified immunity impedes, and in some cases defeats, re-
funding for personnel training, research, media, technology, and the dissemination of
technical assistance and best practices.
H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 83 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 80.
In this regard, Congress was most concerned with "the continued inappropriate placement
of children from minority backgrounds and children with limited English proficiency in special
education." Id. at 85. Clearly, Congress wanted all qualified individuals with disabilities to re-
ceive the benefits of the IDEA. Furthermore, Congress believed that these amendments were
necessary for the country to "see clearer understanding of, and better implementation and fuller
compliance with, the requirements of the IDEA." Id.
164. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 357 (5th Cir. 1981).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(B)(i) (1994); see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 196-200 (1996).
166. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (holding that school
district is not vicariously liable for sexual harassment of students under Title IX of Education
Amendments of 1972). Gebser is analyzed more fully at Part VI.B, infra. See also supra cases
cited in footnote 9.
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covery of the damages caused by violation of the Acts, the defense
must not be made available to those who discriminate.
Had the courts accepting a qualified immunity defense under the
disability discrimination statutes consulted rather than ignored the
language and legislative history of the Acts, they would have con-
cluded that the defense is not available. Instead, the courts have as-
sumed that the immunity of government officials sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 extends equally to officials sued for damages under the Reha-
bilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA. The immunity conferred by Congress
when it enacted § 1983, however, is wholly inapplicable to actions for
damages brought under the disability discrimination statutes.
VI. SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT PERTAIN TO
ACTIONS UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT, THE ADA,
OR THE IDEA
The lower federal courts' reliance upon § 1983 as a source of im-
munity is flawed because the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA
are independent of and unrelated to § 1983. In addition, the fact that
immunity under § 1983 is anchored in the common law as of 1871 con-
firms that the defense has no relevance to disability discrimination
statutes enacted over a century later.
A. The Rehabilitation Act and ADA Were Not Modeled
After § 1983
The Rehabilitation Act and ADA are not linked historically to
§ 1983. Instead, the Rehabilitation Act and in turn its progeny, the
ADA, 16 7 derive from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168 The
Senate report declares that "Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]
was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the anti-discrimination
language of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' '169 In 1978,
Congress reiterated the kinship between the Rehabilitation Act and
Title VI when it adopted the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments, which authorized vic-
tims of disability discrimination to invoke the "remedies, procedures,
and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "117 °
167. As discussed more fully in Part I.B, supra, the ADA expressly incorporates the reme-
dies, procedures and rights under the Rehabilitation Act but extends the Act's antidiscrimina-
tion principle beyond recipients of federal financial assistance.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
169. S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390.
170. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982-83. Like the Rehabilitation Act, Title
VI does not prescribe immunity on the face of the statute. The statute commands, without excep-
tion, "No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The remedies
provision of Title VI is similarly unqualified, specifying that "compliance with this section may
No. 31
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
The express linkage to Title VI exposes the fallacy of looking to
§ 1983 as the font of immunity under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA. Furthermore, the courts have recognized that the elements that
a plaintiff must prove to impose liability for disability discrimination
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are different than the
proof required in a § 1983 action alleging violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the United States Constitution.17 1 In Randolph v.
Rodgers,'17 a hearing-impaired inmate averred that the failure to pro-
vide him a sign language interpreter violated the inmate's rights under
the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and § 1983. The court granted sum-
mary judgment to defendants on the inmate's § 1983 claim, which was
premised upon a deprivation of the guarantees of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reasoned that
be effected by the termination or refusal to grant or continue assistance or by any other means
authorized by law." § 2000d-1.
The legislative history, rather than signaling who shall be immune from the strictures of
Title VI, mirrors the capacious language of the statute and mandates that there is to be no
tolerance of discrimination in federally assisted programs. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
designed to "guarantee that there will be no discrimination among recipients of Federal financial
assistance." H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2394 (em-
phasis added). Title VI was enacted, without equivocation, to carry out "the policy of the United
States that discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin shall not occur.., and
authorizes and directs the appropriate federal departments and agencies to take action to carry
out this policy." Id. at 2400 (emphasis added). In December of 1964, then Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach issued "Guidelines for Enforcement of Title VI" to the heads of 21 depart-
ments and agencies having enforcement responsibilities under Title VI. In a letter accompanying
those Guidelines, Attorney General Katzenbach stressed that the Act was to be applied without
exception: "There should be no mistaking the clear intent and effect of the Guidelines-Title VI
must and will be enforced. Assistance will be refused or terminated to noncomplying recipients
and applicants who are not amenable to other sanctions." Federal Race Guidelines, XXI CONG.
Q. ALMANAC 567, 567 (1965).
Supporters of the bill instructed the courts to join with the other branches of government in
the common enterprise of eradicating discrimination:
Congress must move rapidly-more rapidly than it has to date-to legislate intelligently and
effectively in this critical area. The agencies of Government must strive more actively to
enforce the law of the land. The courts-State and Federal-must exercise greater vigilance
in guarding the interests of all the people.
Additional Views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCullough, Hon. John V. Lindsay, Hon.
William T. Cahill, Hon. Garner E. Shriver, Hon. Clark MacGregor, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias,
and Hon. James E. Bromwell, H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt.2, at 32 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2518-19.
The Senate report to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 recapitulated the legislature's
intent that Title VI was to be liberally construed: "When Congress enacted Title VI, it empha-
sized the breadth of its coverage.... Indeed, both proponents and opponents agreed that the
prohibition of discrimination would be a broad one.... The inescapable conclusion is that Con-
gress intended that title VI ... be given the broadest interpretation." S. REP. No. 100-64, at 5-7
(1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7-9.
171. See Davis v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1998); Randolph v.
Rodgers, 980 F. Supp. 1051, 1058, 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp.
1126, 1134-35, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The courts also have applied separate standards to § 1983
claims premised upon violation of other guarantees of the Constitution. See Duda v. Board of
Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1062 (7th Cir. 1988) (constitutional
right to privacy); Hutchinson v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997) (substantive due pro-
cess); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1996) (due process clause).
172. 980 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mo. 1997), rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds,
170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999).
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because a disability is not a "suspect class" within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause, plaintiff could not prove that he was treated
disparately based upon a suspect classification.' 73 In addition, plaintiff
could not establish that he was treated differently from similarly situ-
ated hearing-impaired inmates. 174
While rejecting the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the court applied a
different standard of liability to the claims under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. The court held that the inmate had established a
violation of the ADA by proving that: (1) he had a disability; (2) he
was otherwise qualified for the benefit at issue; and (3) he was ex-
cluded from the benefit because of discrimination solely on the basis
of his disability.' 75 The inmate also had proven that the program from
which he was excluded received federal financial assistance, the one
additional element required to establish a violation of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. 176 Accordingly, while it had granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, the court granted summary
judgment to plaintiff on the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims.177
Just as the Rehabilitation Act and ADA do not incorporate the stan-
dard of liability applicable to discrimination claims under § 1983,
these acts do not adopt the immunity defense available in actions
under that historically unrelated statute.
B. The IDEA Was Not Patterned After § 1983
Like the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the IDEA has a line-
age completely distinct from § 1983. The IDEA traces its roots to Title
VI of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.178 Title
VI was supplanted by the EHA, 79 which consolidated into a single
statute the various programs of education for the disabled that were
administered by the Commissioner of Education. Among other things,
the EHA authorized the Commissioner to make grants "for the pur-
pose of assisting the States in the initiation, expansion, and improve-
ment of programs and projects for the education of handicapped
children at the preschool, elementary school, and secondary school
levels."' ° The Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974
added significant provisions to the EHA requiring, among other
173. See id. at 1058.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1061.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1062. The court, however, held that because it was not clearly established that
the Acts applied to prisons, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims. See id. at 1061.
178. Title VI was added to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 by the
Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat.
1191, 1204-10 (repealed 1971).
179. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 121, 175-88 (1970). Note that § 662(3), 84 Stat.
at 188 repealed Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
180. § 611, 84 Stat. at 178.
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things, that states seeking federal monies ensure to the fullest extent
appropriate that children with disabilities be educated with children
who are not disabled. Disabled children were to be removed from the
"regular educational environment ... only when the nature or severity
of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." '181
The 1974 amendments further provided procedural guarantees to dis-
abled children and their parents in connection with the identification,
evaluation, and educational placement of the disabled child."8 '
The procedural and substantive protections of the EHA were fur-
ther strengthened by the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 (1975 Act). The 1975 Act stiffened the eligibility stan-
dards for receipt of federal grant money, generally demanding that
each state detail the policies and procedures by which it will assure
that "a free appropriate public education will be available ... for all
handicapped children between the ages of three and twenty-one. 183
The 1975 Act also enhanced the procedural protections afforded fami-
lies of disabled children, including the requirement that each local or
intermediate educational unit seeking funding provide assurances that
at the beginning of each school year it "will establish, or revise, which-
ever is appropriate, an individualized education program [IEP] for
each handicapped child."1" The Education of the Handicapped Act
Amendments of 1990 changed the title of the Act to its present form,
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), expanded the
range of disabilities covered under the Act, and reauthorized the dis-
cretionary grant programs which promote the common goal of "im-
provement of early intervention, special education, and related
services provided to infants, toddlers, children, and youth with
disabilities. 185
From this cursory overview of the history of the IDEA, it is ap-
parent that the legislation is the culmination of a quarter-century ef-
fort to provide for the equal and appropriate education of the disabled
and in no way is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Hence, as
is true of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, affording § 1983 im-
munity to officials sued under the IDEA cannot be justified by any
historic linkage between the statutes.
181. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 614(d), 88 Stat. 580, 581-82 (1974).
182. See id. at 582.
183. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 5, 89 Stat.
773, 780.
184. § 5, 89 Stat. at 786. The IEP is to be generated from a meeting of a representative of the
educational unit "qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruc-
tion to meet the unique needs of handicapped children," the teacher, the parents or guardian of
the child, and in appropriate cases, the child. See id. § 4, 89 Stat. at 776. The IEP must include a
statement of annual goals as well as identify the specific educational services to be supplied to
the child and the extent to which the child will be able to join in regular educational programs.
See id.
185. H.R. REP. No. 101-544, pt. I, at 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1724.
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In 1986, Congress expressly confirmed that the IDEA affords
rights and remedies entirely independent of those provided by § 1983
when it added subsection (f) to 20 U.S.C. § 1415. This amendment was
promulgated in response to the United States Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Smith v. Robinson.186 In Smith, the Court held that Congress
intended that the EHA be the sole and exclusive means through
which a disabled child may pursue a claim to a free appropriate public
education. 87 Under Smith, an aggrieved family could not pursue a
claim under § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause to the
Fourteenth Amendment arising out of the failure to provide educa-
tional services to a disabled child. The 1986 amendment counter-
manded Smith, providing:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitu-
tion, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal
statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children and youth,
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seek-
ing relief that is also available under this part, the procedures
under subsections (b)(2) and (c) shall be exhausted to the same
extent as would be required had the action been brought under
this part. 188
By restoring the rights of families of disabled children to pursue con-
stitutional claims through § 1983, the amendment made clear that the
IDEA stands entirely apart from § 1983. As the House report stated,
the amendment was passed to "reaffirm ...the viability of . . . 42
U.S.C. § 1983 .. .as [a] separate vehicle[ ] for ensuring the rights of
handicapped children." 18 9
The autonomy of the IDEA is confirmed by the separate stan-
dards of liability governing equal protection claims under § 1983 and
claimed violations of the IDEA. The different standards were summa-
rized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Sellers v. School Board:1 9°
Under IDEA, the simple failure to provide a child with a free
appropriate public education constitutes a violation of the statute.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). By contrast, plaintiffs must meet a higher
standard of liability to prevail on a constitutional claim. The
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis requires that an
equal protection claim be supported by evidence of purposeful
discrimination. . . .And even if a plaintiff can prove a school
186. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
187. See id. at 1018-21.
188. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 3, 100 Stat. 796,
797. This section was amended again in 1997 to provide that the IDEA similarly does not limit
rights and remedies provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101, 111 Stat. 37, 98.
189. H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4 (1985) (emphasis added).
190. 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 168 (1998).
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board intended to treat children differently because of their disa-
bilities, another hurdle would remain. Because the Supreme
Court has yet to classify disabled persons as a suspect class, and
because the Court also has not identified education as a funda-
mental right, a plaintiff in this context would have to prove that a
school board's decision was without any rational basis. Naturally
school boards will be subject to liability for statutory IDEA viola-
tions much more frequently than for similarly pled constitutional
claims. 191
In one of its final cases of the past term, the United States
Supreme Court prominently acknowledged that § 1983 and modern
civil rights legislation are to be afforded independent interpretations.
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 92 the Court was
called upon to decide under what circumstances a school district could
be held liable for damages under Title IX of the Education Amend-
191. Sellers, 141 F.3d at 530-31 (citations omitted). The Sellers court relied upon the differ-
ent standards of culpability to conclude that litigants could not bring § 1983 actions to redress
violation of the IDEA. While most commonly used as the mechanism to redress deprivations of
federal constitutional rights caused by persons acting under color of state law, by its terms § 1983
also provides redress for violations of rights secured by the laws of the United States. Under this
language, plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant's discriminatory conduct is actionable under
§ 1983 as a violation of federal law or, to be more exact, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, or the
IDEA. Generally, these plaintiffs have pursued this separate course of action to avoid an ex-
haustion of administrative remedies requirement or to obtain relief not expressly provided for in
the disability discrimination statutes.
The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may proceed under § 1983 to remedy violations
of federal statutes as well as deprivations of rights secured by the federal Constitution. See
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980). However, the ability to bring an action pursuant to
§ 1983 to vindicate rights conferred by other federal statutes is not unlimited. The Supreme
Court has ruled that a plaintiff will not be permitted to proceed under § 1983 to redress statutory
violations if "(1) 'the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within
the meaning of § 1983,' or (2) 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the
enactment itself."' Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)); see
also Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132-33 (1994). Under this standard, the lower federal
courts have had to determine whether the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the IDEA fore-
close the use of § 1983 as an independent means of seeking relief for violations of the statutes.
The courts have divided over whether parties may assert a cause of action under § 1983 for
violations of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. Compare Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112
F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that Rehabilitation Act and the ADA provide exten-
sive and comprehensive remedial framework that precludes enforcement under § 1983), with
Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dep't, 991 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (permitting
a claim seeking to recover for violation of Rehabilitation Act through § 1983). There is a pro-
nounced split in the circuits over whether § 1983 may be employed to redress violations of the
IDEA. Compare Sellers v. School Bd. of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 168 (1998), Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that plaintiff could not pursue claim for general damages under § 1983 based on alleged
violations of IDEA), and Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 387
(6th Cir. 1992) (holding that violations of EHA do not give rise to cause of action under § 1983),
with W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that violations of the IDEA may
be redressed through § 1983). In those jurisdictions that hold violations of the disability discrimi-
nation acts are not redressable under § 1983, it obviously would be anomalous to endorse the
converse proposition that § 1983 defenses may be asserted in suits filed directly under the Reha-
bilitation Act, the ADA, and the IDEA.
192. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
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ments of 1972,'93 which prohibits education programs receiving fed-
eral funds from discriminating on the basis of sex.19 In a five to four
opinion, the Court concluded that a school district was not vicariously
liable for every act of sexual harassment of students by its teachers.
Instead, the Court held:
[I]n cases ... that do not involve official policy ... a damages
remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a mini-
mum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the recipient [of federal funds]
behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's
programs and fails adequately to respond.195
The failure to respond must rise to the level of deliberate indifference
to the risk of discrimination before the district will be held liable. 196
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court recognized that the
standards of liability it found to govern actions under Title IX are en-
tirely distinct from standards of culpability under § 1983, enacted a
century earlier. The Court expressly limited its holding to Title IX,
stating, "Our decision does not affect any right of recovery that an
individual may have against a school district as a matter of state law or
against a teacher in his individual capacity under state law or under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.' a 9 7 For the same reason that the standard of liability
under Title IX has no bearing on litigation under § 1983, the Court's
construction of qualified immunity under § 1983 does not extend to
actions under the independent disability discrimination statutes.
C. The Common Law Origin of Qualified Immunity Under § 1983
Confirms § 1983 Immunity Is Inapplicable to Actions Under
the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the IDEA
The fact that immunity of public officials sued for damages under
§ 1983 originates in the common law as of 1871 confirms that § 1983
immunity does not extend to officials sued under the disability dis-
crimination statutes enacted over a hundred years later. The text of
§ 1983 makes no reference to any immunity; to the contrary, it holds
liable "every person" who, acting under color of state law, causes a
constitutional violation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court first recog-
nized qualified immunity under § 1983 in Pierson v. Ray,198 a damage
action against Jackson, Mississippi, police officers who arrested Free-
dom Riders attempting to use a segregated waiting room at an inter-
state bus terminal. The Court reversed the lower courts' refusal to
193. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
194. Like the Rehabilitation Act, Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1997.
195. Id. at 1999.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 2000.
198. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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allow the officers to assert any immunity to the Freedom Riders' claim
under § 1983. Because Congress did not expressly abrogate the well-
established immunities that existed at common law when it enacted
§ 1983 in 1871, the Court reasoned, it was Congress's presumed intent
to incorporate those immunities. 199 Consequently, the police officers
sued in Pierson were entitled to avail themselves of the defenses of
good faith and probable cause that were available at common law
when Congress enacted § 1983.200
With varying fidelity,201 the Supreme Court has continued to ref-
erence the common law as of 1871 to determine immunity under
§ 1983. Not only has the Court extended immunity to officials who
were absolved under the common law, but the Court has also refused
to confer qualified immunity on officials who did not benefit from im-
munity at common law as of 1871. For example, in Tower v. Glover,2 "2
the Court held that a public defender sued under § 1983 could not
assert a qualified immunity defense.2 0 3 The Court reasoned that be-
cause the office of public defender was first established in 1914, no
immunity existed at common law in 1871. Furthermore, English bar-
risters sued for intentional acts enjoyed no immunity in the nineteenth
century. In addition, as of 1871, privately retained lawyers in the
United States were not shielded by immunity for their intentional
wrongs. Absent any common law foundation for immunity, the Court
refused to countenance immunity under § 1983.204
199. See id. at 553-56.
200. Qualified immunity in actions to redress constitutional violations inflicted by federal
officials ultimately is founded in the common law as well. In determining what immunity exists in
the cause of action implied from the Constitution, the Court reasoned that immunity of federal
officials in Bivens actions should be identical to the immunity of counterpart state officials sued
under § 1983. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). Thus as with state officials sued
under § 1983, the immunity of federal officials sued for constitutional violations emanates from
the common law as it existed in 1871.
201. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). In Anderson, the court stated:
[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be
slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. That notion is plainly
contradicted by Harlow [v. Fitzgerald], where the Court completely reformulated qualified
immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into
subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into the
legal reasonableness of the official action.
Id.; see also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 415-16 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
truth to tell, Procunier v. Navarette ... did not trouble itself with history... but simply set forth
a policy prescription.").
202. 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
203. See id. at 921. The Supreme Court had held in Polk County v. Dodson that appointed
counsel in a state prosecution does not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983. 454 U.S.
312, 325 (1981). However, the Court in Dennis v. Sparks, held that private persons who are
alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of federal consti-
tutional rights do act under color of state law and therefore are suable under § 1983. 449 U.S. 24,
29 (1980). The plaintiff in Tower v. Glover alleged that the public defenders who unsuccessfully
represented him on a robbery charge had conspired with the trial and appellate court judges as
well as the Attorney General of Oregon to secure his conviction. 467 U.S. 914, 916 (1984).
204. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 920-23; see also Richardson, 521 U.S. at 406-07 (holding that
guards employed by a private prison management firm are not entitled to assert qualified immu-
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The fact that immunity under § 1983 is grounded in the common
law as of 1871 confirms that § 1983 immunity does not govern the trio
of disability discrimination statutes. Just as is it clear that Congress did
not pattern the disability acts after § 1983, it is patent that when it
passed the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA over a century later,
Congress did not intend to silently incorporate state common law im-
munities defined as of 1871.
In the era in which the disability discrimination legislation was
enacted, immunity under state law had ceased to be a matter of com-
mon law. Instead, states legislatively tailored the scope of immunity
accorded their officials.2 °5 Congress certainly did not intend to incor-
porate state statutory defenses to liability when it enacted the Reha-
bilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA. Under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, state law cannot immunize conduct of offi-
cials that transgresses federal law.20 6 There is no evidence that Con-
gress meant to abrogate the ordinary effect of the Supremacy Clause
when it chose to broadly guarantee federal protection against discrim-
nity defense in prisoner § 1983 actions where neither English nor American common law fur-
nished immunity to private jailers). The Court also has relied upon the common law as of 1871 to
repudiate a government official's claim to absolute immunity. In Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
Inc., the Court refused absolute immunity for a court reporter whose failure to produce a tran-
script delayed the hearing of an appeal from a criminal trial until four years following the convic-
tion. 508 U.S. 429, 431, 437 (1993). The Court reasoned that when deciding which officials
perform functions that might require absolute liability "we have undertaken 'a considered in-
quiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the inter-
ests behind it."' Id. at 432 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 508). Because official court reporters were
first employed in the late 19th century, the Court found they were not among the persons pro-
tected when the common law doctrine of qualified immunity emerged. See id. at 433-34.
205. ALASKA STAT. § 26.20.140 (LEXIS 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.02 (West
1992 & Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.6
(West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001 (West
1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-24 (West
1999); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128-18 (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (1998); 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/2-201, 202 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-3-3 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 670.2 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6103, -6104 (1997); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2798.1 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (West 1964 & Supp. 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (Law.
Co-op. 1992); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1407 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West
1997 & Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (1972 & Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.600
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-920 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.032,
.0334 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 541-B:11, -B:19 (1997); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59:3-1, -2, -3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (Michie 1996); N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 17 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-04 (1996);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 153 (West 1988);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (1988 & Supp. 1998); 1998 PA. LEGIS. SERV. tit. 42, §§ 8545, 8548, 8549,
8550 (West); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1, -8, -9, -12 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-40, -60 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-22-1 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 29-20-
201, -205 (1980 & Supp. 1998); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. tit. 5, ch. 101, §§ 101.021,
104.002 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-3, -4, -10 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 5601, 5602 (1973 & Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1998);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.060, .070 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE §§ 29-12A-5, -
6, -11 (1992 & Supp. 1998); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1997).
206. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980).
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ination on the basis of disability. To the contrary, the disability dis-
crimination statutes were passed in part to overcome the deficiencies
in state law by affording federal protection to the rights of the dis-
abled. As the House report to the ADA observed, "State laws are
inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that
people with disabilities are facing .... The 50 state Governor's Com-
mittees ... report that existing state laws do not adequately counter
acts of discrimination against people with disabilities."20 7 Against this
background, it is incongruous to conclude that Congress intended to
allow state law defenses to undermine the "compelling need to estab-
lish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of disability. 2 8
VII. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MAY NOT BE JUDICIALLY
LEGISLATED FOR ACTIONS UNDER THE REHABILITATION
ACT, ADA, OR IDEA
If Congress did not prescribe qualified immunity for public offi-
cials who intentionally discriminate, then it must be the courts that
have legislated this defense to damage actions under the disability dis-
crimination statutes. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, in applying the defense to an action under the ADA, has
frankly admitted that qualified immunity is "[j]udicially created."209
In interpreting statutes, the courts ordinarily are limited to ascer-
taining the will of the legislature and lack the power to manufacture
defenses not intended by Congress. The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged this limitation on judicial authority in Tower v. Glover, where it
held that public defenders sued under § 1983 do not have any immu-
nity because no immunity existed at common law at the time Congress
enacted § 1983:
[Pletitioners contend that public defenders have responsibilities
similar to those of a judge or prosecutor and therefore should
enjoy similar immunities .... Petitioners' concerns may be well
founded, but the remedy petitioners urge is not for us to adopt.
We do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 ac-
tions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy.
It is for Congress to determine whether § 1983 litigation has be-
come too burdensome to state or federal institutions and, if so,
what remedial action is appropriate.21 0
207. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 329.
208. Id. at 310.
209. Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 1996).
210. 467 U.S. 914, 922-23 (1984); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171-72 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated:
It must be remembered that unlike the common-law judges whose doctrines we adopt, we
are devising limitations to a remedial statute, enacted by the Congress, which "on its face
does not provide for any immunities." We have imported common-law doctrines in the past
because of our conclusion that the Congress which enacted § 1983 acted in light of existing
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A bare majority of the Supreme Court, however, has assigned itself
greater authority to shape the remedial scheme when construing im-
plied causes of action. Even under the standards governing this
heightened power to fashion remedies under implied causes of action,
qualified immunity is not available as a defense to disability
discrimination.
In its five to four opinion in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District,21' the Court proclaimed its power to engage in limited
lawmaking in contouring causes of action implied from statutes. The
Gebser Court addressed the circumstances under which a school dis-
trict would be liable under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972212 for the sexual harassment of a student by one of the district's
teachers. The majority commenced its analysis by observing that be-
cause the private cause of action for damages under Title IX was not
expressly set forth in the statute but was judicially inferred, the legisla-
tion does not detail the precise conditions under which money dam-
ages should be awarded.213 The absence of an express legislative
direction, the Court concluded, conferred upon the judiciary "a mea-
sure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best com-
ports with the statute. 2
14
The Gebser Court did not arrogate uncircumscribed judicial au-
thority to tailor remedies in an implied cause of action. When the lan-
guage of a statute does not reveal the legislature's intent, Congress's
intended purpose continues to steer the analysis. The court's task is
"'to infer how the ... Congress would have addressed the issue had
the... action been included as an express provision in the' statute. '215
Thus even after Gebser, courts are not at liberty to impose their policy
preferences upon the statutory scheme.
The courts' expanded role in shaping implied causes of action
does not apply to the IDEA, for Congress expressly authorized a
cause of action to redress violation of that act.21 6 To determine
whether it is appropriate to recognize qualified immunity as a defense
to implied causes of action for damages under the Rehabilitation Act
legal principles. That suggests, however, that we may not transform what existed at common
law based on our notions of policy or efficiency.
Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). In Malley, the Court stated:
We reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to
make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress' intent
by the common-law tradition .... Since the statute on its face does not provide for any
immunities, we would be going far to read into it an absolute immunity for conduct which
was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871.
Malley, 475 U.S. at 342.
211. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
212. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
213. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1994-96.
214. Id. at 1996.
215. Id. at 1997 (quoting Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994)).
216. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1994 & 1998 Supp.).
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and the ADA, courts must inquire how Congress would have legis-
lated had it considered the issue of immunity. It is apparent that if
Congress had debated the defense, it would not have endorsed quali-
fied immunity when it enacted the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
A. At the Time the Rehabilitation Act Was Promulgated, Qualified
Immunity Was Available Only to Officials Who Acted in
Good Faith
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,217 the Supreme
Court delineated the sources of law to be consulted in ascertaining
Congress's will under an implied statutory cause of action, in that
case, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Because
the cause of action is implied, the usual sources of Congress's intent-
the text and legislative history of the statute-will not be determina-
tive. Therefore, to divine whether Congress intended to override the
presumption that all appropriate remedies be available, the Court
evaluated the state of the law under Supreme Court decisions at the
time Congress enacted Title IX. 218
To discern whether Congress would have intended to authorize
qualified immunity as a defense to damage actions under the Rehabil-
itation Act and ADA, it is necessary to examine the controlling case
law defining immunity in existence between 1973, the year in which
the Rehabilitation Act was passed, and 1978, when the Act was
amended to make available the remedies of Title VI. 219 During and
just before this period, the Supreme Court had interpreted qualified
immunity in three § 1983 cases: Pierson v. Ray,2 ° Scheuer v.
Rhodes,221 and Wood v. Strickland.222 In each of these cases, the
Court held that to be immune from liability for damages, a govern-
ment official must satisfy not only an objective standard, but must
have subjectively acted in good faith as well.
The first Supreme Court case to define qualified immunity was
Pierson v. Ray ,223 a § 1983 action against police officers who had ar-
rested Freedom Riders for violating a provision of the Mississippi
Code that made it a misdemeanor to "congregate [ ] with others in a
public place under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may
be occasioned thereby, and refuse[ ] to move on when ordered to do
so by a police officer. '22 4 The Pierson Court held that although the
217. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
218. See id. at 71.
219. Although the ADA was not enacted until 1990, it expressly incorporated the cause of
action preexisting under the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12,133 (1995).
220. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
221. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
222. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
223. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
224. Id. at 549.
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statute authorizing the arrest of the Freedom Riders was unconstitu-
tional, the officers could avail themselves of the same immunity de-
fense in the federal § 1983 action that would be available in a common
law action for false arrest and false imprisonment.225 To prevail under
this defense, however, the officers would be required to establish not
only objective probable cause, but also subjective good faith in mak-
ing an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid.226 If, as
they contended, the officers arrested the Freedom Riders to prevent
violence, the officers would be immune. On the other hand, if there
was no threat of violence and the officers' intent in arresting the Free-
dom Riders was to preserve segregation, the officers' actions would
not be immunized.
The next case to interpret qualified immunity similarly construed
the defense to demand proof of subjective good faith. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes,227 the Supreme Court refused to confer absolute immunity
upon the governor of the state of Ohio and other executive branch
officials in a § 1983 suit arising out of the shooting deaths of four stu-
dents during an anti-Vietnam War protest at Kent State University. 28
Instead, the Court held, these officials could assert only a qualified
immunity defense. As in Pierson, the Scheuer Court defined the im-
munity to demand not only objectively reasonable conduct, but sub-
jective good faith as well:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of
the executive branch of government, the variation being depen-
dent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office
and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time
of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time
and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith be-
lief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive of-
ficers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.2 2 9
The Supreme Court reiterated that subjective good faith is a pre-
requisite to qualified immunity in Wood v. Strickland, a § 1983 action
against school board members and school officials who had partici-
pated in expelling plaintiffs from high school.23° The trial court had
entered a directed verdict in favor of the defendants because plaintiffs
had offered no evidence that the school officials were animated by
malice. The court of appeals reversed, opining that the test for immu-
nity is purely objective, not subjective.
225. See id. at 557.
226. See id. at 556-57.
227. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
228. See id. at 247-48.
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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The Supreme Court held that to be immune, an official must not
only satisfy an objective criterion, but also must subjectively act in
good faith.z3' The Wood Court found subjective good faith demanded
by the common law, which protected school officials from liability
only for "all good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to fulfill their offi-
cial duties."23 The Court further reasoned that as a matter of policy, it
is appropriate to insist that an official subjectively act in good faith to
be immune.233
Under the subjective prong of the defense, qualified immunity
would not be available to officials who acted with a wrongful intent.
The Wood Court pointed out that the common law did not afford ab-
solute immunity to school officials because such immunity would deny
redress to students who were subjected to intentional deprivations of
their rights.234 Accordingly, a school board member would not be im-
mune under § 1983 "if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student. ' '235
B. Proof of the Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination
Negates the Subjective Tier of the Qualified
Immunity Defense
At the time the Rehabilitation Act was enacted and amended, the
Supreme Court had consistently held that in actions under §1983,
qualified immunity would not shelter government officials who acted
with wrongful intent.236 Assuming Congress had consulted the § 1983
231. See id. at 318.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 321 (finding that school officials should not be liable for actions taken "in the
good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds of reason under all the
circumstances").
234. See id. at 320.
235. Id. at 322.
236. The Court's interpretations of immunity were informed by the common law, which was
the avowed source of immunity under § 1983. As previously analyzed, at the time the disability
discrimination statutes were enacted, statutes had supplanted the common law in conferring im-
munity under state law. Even if it were hypothesized that Congress consulted state statutory
immunities when it passed and amended the Rehabilitation Act, Congress would have under-
stood that an official is required to act subjectively in good faith to be immune. State statutes
consistently deny immunity to officials for intentional wrongs and actions taken in bad faith. See
ALASKA STAT. § 26.20.140(b) (LEXIS 1998) (mandating no liability "except in cases of wilful
misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.02 (1992) (man-
dating no liability "[u]nless a public employee acting within the scope of his employment in-
tended to cause injury or was grossly negligent"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (Michie 1996).
Arkansas courts have interpreted the statute to not cover intentional torts. See Battle v. Harris,
766 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Ark. 1989) ("[T]hat immunity [does not] include intentional torts commit-
ted by those officials."); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.8 (West 1995) ("Nothing in this section
exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent
or wrongful act or omission."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165 (West 1998) (mandating no
liability if action is "not wanton, reckless or malicious"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001 (West
1999) (mandating no liability where acts were in connection with official duty, acts were done in
good faith, and were done "without gross or wanton negligence"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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§ 768.28(9)(a) (West 1997) (mandating no liability "unless such officer, employee, or agent acted
in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
human rights, safety, or property"); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-24 (West 1999) ("[N]o liability for
losses resulting from ... [a]n act or omission by a state officer or employee exercising due care
. ...."); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128-18 (Michie 1995) (mandating no liability "except in cases of
wilful misconduct"); IDAHO CODE § 6-904 (1998) (mandating that government actors are not
liable "while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent"); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-202 (West 1994) ("A public employee is not
liable... unless such act or omission constitutes wilful and wanton conduct."); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-13-3-3(8) (West Supp. 1998) ("not liable if a loss results from ... an act or omission per-
formed in good faith and without malice"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 670.2 (West 1998) (mandating
no liability for unpaid service providers, "except for acts or omissions which involve intentional
misconduct or knowing violation of the law"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6103(a) (1997) ("Subject to
[exceptions], each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any of its employees"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2798.1(C)(2) (West
1997) ("The provisions... are not applicable ... [t]o acts or omissions which constitute criminal,
fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct."); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (West 1999) (mandating no waiver of immunity for state
personnel unless they act "without malice or gross negligence"); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2
(Law. Co-op. 1992) (mandating that officers "shall be liable for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by negligent or wrongful act or omission"); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1407 (West 1999) (stating no liability where employee believes he is acting within the
scope of his authority, his agency was engaged in a governmental function, and where his con-
duct does not amount to gross negligence); 1996 MINN. LAWS § 3.736(9a) (1997) ("This subdivi-
sion (indemnification) does not apply in case of malfeasance in office or willful or wanton
actions or neglect of duty ...."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5(2) (1998) ("[Clonsidered to have
waived immunity for any conduct ... if the employee's conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel,
slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations."); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.600 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) ("[Immunity does not apply if] either a negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission .... ); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-8,215.01 to -8,215.19 (West 1999); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0334 (Michie 1996) ("[Immunity] does not apply to any action for injury,
wrongful death or other damage: (a) Intentionally caused or contributed to by an officer or
employee of the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions .... ); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-B:19 (1997) ("[Immunity] shall not apply to: (d) Any claim arising out of an inten-
tional tort [statute then gives examples.]"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-3 (West 1982) ("A public
employee is not liable if he acts in good faith .... "); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(E) (Michie 1996)
("A government entity shall have the right to recover from a public employee the amount ex-
pended .. .if it is shown that, while acting within the scope of his duty, the public employee
acted fraudulently or with actual intentional malice ...."); N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 17(3)(a)
(McKinney 1988) ("[T]he duty to indemnify and save harmless or pay prescribed by this subdivi-
sion shall not arise where the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing ....");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-04(3) (1996) ("unless the acts or omissions constitute reckless or
grossly negligent conduct, or willful or wanton misconduct"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86
(Anderson 1990) (mandating no officer or employee liability "unless the officer or employee
acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner"); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51, §§ 152, 153 (West 1999) (mandating no liability for employees "acting within the
scope of employment," defined as "performance by an employee acting in good faith within the
duties of his office"); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(f) (1988) (mandating no liability "unless such act
was done or omitted in bad faith or with malice"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8550 (West 1988)
(Immunity does not apply if "it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the
injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.");
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-9 (1997) (State may not assume liability of an employee if the attorney
general determines that "the act or failure to act was because of actual fraud, willful misconduct,
or actual malice."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-70 (Law. Co-Op. 1997) (No immunity "if it is
proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it
constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205 (1980) ("[Immunity] removed for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of any employee."); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 104.002(a)(1) (West 1999) (State must indemnify employee in scope of duties "except a willful
or wrongful act or an act of gross negligence."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-4(3)(b)(i) (1997) (no
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qualified immunity standard when it enacted and amended the Reha-
bilitation Act, it would have concluded that no immunity should be
available to an official sued for damages for disability discrimination.
It is axiomatic that proof of the prima facie case always would dis-
prove subjective good faith and thereby defeat any claim to qualified
immunity.
To recover damages for disability discrimination, it does not suf-
fice to prove that the effect of a government officer's conduct is dis-
criminatory; the plaintiff must further prove that the official acted
with an intent to discriminate on the basis of disability.237 If the plain-
tiff establishes that the official intended to discriminate, the official
could not at the same time have acted in good faith. Thus the immu-
nity defense would in every case be meaningless and superfluous.
In Flores v. Pierce, a § 1983 action alleging that city officials
delayed issuance of a liquor license because of plaintiff's race and na-
tional origin, the court of appeals held that it was unnecessary to in-
struct the jury on the qualified immunity defense:
[O]nce a defendant is shown to have acted with intent to discrimi-
nate based on racial or ethnic hostility, such intent constitutes the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
that is inconsistent with the subjective state of mind required for
the defense of good faith immunity.
If the jury found that the defendants acted with the pro-
scribed discriminatory intent, the defendants would not have
been entitled to immunity; if, however, discriminatory intent were
not proved, then there would be no violation of the equal protec-
tion clause, no cause of action under section 1983, and no need
for immunity to protect an official from liability for damages.
Under the first possibility immunity is not present and under the
second it would not be needed.238
immunity "if the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 5602 (1973) (mandating state liability for employee's acts that are wrongful or negligent,
which happens unless the claim arises "out of alleged assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest.., misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, interference with contractual rights or invasion of the
right to privacy"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie 1992) (mandating that employee "shall
be liable for claims for money only ... on account of damage to or loss of property or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.92.070 (West 1988) (State will provide defense only "if the attorney general shall find that
said officer, employee, or volunteer's act or omissions were, or purported to be in good faith.");
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-11(a)(2) (1992) (State will indemnify employee "if at the time of the act
or omission the employee was acting in good faith."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(7) (West 1996)
("No suit may be brought against any [government employee or official] who, in good faith, acts
or fails to act ...."). But see WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104(b) (Michie 1997) ("When liability is
alleged against any public employee, if the governmental entity determines he was acting within
the scope of his duty, whether or not alleged to have been committed maliciously or fraudulently,
the government entity shall provide a defense at its expense." (emphasis added)).
237. See supra Part II.
238. 617 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis
County, Mo., 729 F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1984) ("If the jury finds that intentional discrimination
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Just as proof of an intent to discriminate would disprove good faith in
Flores, the subjective tier of the qualified immunity defense would be
negated in every instance in which the plaintiff proved the intentional
discrimination necessary to satisfy the prima facie case in damage ac-
tions under the Rehabilitation Act. As in Flores, immunity would be
unnecessary if the plaintiff were to fail to meet its burden of proving
discriminatory intent. Consequently, had Congress considered quali-
fied immunity when it enacted and amended the Rehabilitation Act,
Congress would have concluded that the defense plays no role in a
statute that requires plaintiff to prove intent to discriminate to recover
damages.
C. The Supreme Court's Subsequent Abrogation of the Subjective
Tier of the Qualified Immunity Defense for § 1983 Actions
Is Irrelevant to Congress's Intention Under the
Rehabilitation Act
In 1982, the Supreme Court abrogated the subjective prong of the
qualified immunity test for § 1983 actions, thus admitting of the possi-
bility of immunity even where the government official engaged in in-
tentional wrongdoing. The Court's modification of the immunity
standard, however, is irrelevant to Congress's intent nine years earlier
when it passed the Rehabilitation Act.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,239 the Supreme Court eliminated the re-
quirement that an official must act in good faith to be immune. After
Harlow, immunity is governed by a purely objective standard. Hence
even if an official acts with the intent to injure the plaintiff, the official
is immune if the constitutional right violated was not clearly estab-
lished. The Harlow Court did not premise its refashioning of the qual-
ified immunity standard upon a concomitant evolution in the source
of the immunity, the common law.24 0 To the contrary, the Court "com-
pletely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all em-
bodied in the common law." 241
The lone reason the Court abrogated the subjective tier was the
perceived social costs of litigating the issue of the intent of govern-
ment actors-the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official en-
ergy from pressing issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office.2 42 The Court believed these costs were
exacerbated by inquiry into the subjective intent of the official be-
has occurred . . . 'good faith' on the part of the defendant is logically excluded."); Williams v.
Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 629 F.2d 993, 1004 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that trial court
properly refused to charge jury on qualified immunity in § 1983 action because malicious intent
to injure is inconsistent with subjective good faith).
239. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
240. See id. at 815-20.
241. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
242. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
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cause of the wider discovery required where intent is at issue, as well
as the inability to dispose of intent issues on summary judgment.243 To
reduce the burdens imposed by judicial inquiry into the intent of gov-
ernment actors, the Court abolished the subjective aspect of the quali-
fied immunity and further instructed that no discovery should be
permitted until the trial court resolves whether defendant satisfied the
objective prong of the immunity.
The Supreme Court's unilateral redefinition of qualified immu-
nity for § 1983 actions does not resurrect immunity as a viable defense
to suits for damages under the Rehabilitation Act and its progeny, the
ADA. First, it is doubtful that the intent of Congress is ever properly
determined by unforeseeable developments in case law years after a
statute is passed.244 It is particularly improbable that the Congress
that passed the Rehabilitation Act intended to delegate to the
Supreme Court the plenary power to subsequently immunize inten-
tional discrimination based upon the Court's unilateral analysis of the
costs of litigating the issue of intent.245
Second, the policy goal that animated the Harlow Court's abroga-
tion of the subjective aspect of the qualified immunity-saving the
costs of litigation associated with the issue of intent-cannot be
243. See id. It is debatable whether the latter concern remains true. As Justice Kennedy
wrote in his concurring opinion in Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992):
Harlow was decided at a time when the standards applicable to summary judgment made it
difficult for a defendant to secure summary judgment regarding a factual question such as
subjective intent, even when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the question; and in
Harlow we relied on that fact in adopting an objective standard for summary judgment. 457
U.S. at 815-819. However, subsequent clarifications to summary-judgment law have allevi-
ated that problem, by allowing summary judgment to be entered against a nonmoving party
"who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under the principles set forth in Celotex and
related cases, the strength of factual allegations such as subjective bad faith can be tested at
the summary-judgment stage.
See also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 126 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Celotex adequately pro-
tects public officials from groundless allegations of 'bad' intent.").
244. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 65-66 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehn-
quist argues:
The Court's opinion purports to pursue an inquiry into legislative intent, yet relies heavily
upon state-court decisions decided well after the 42d Congress adjourned .... I find these
cases unilluminating, at least in part because I am unprepared to attribute to the 42d Con-
gress the truly extraordinary foresight that the Court seems to think it had. The reason our
earlier decisions interpreting § 1983 have relied upon common-law decisions is simple:
Members of the 42d Congress were lawyers, familiar with the law of their time. In resolving
ambiguities in the enactments of that Congress, as with other Congresses, it is useful to
consider the principles and legal rules that shaped the thinking of its Members. The deci-
sions of state courts decided well after 1871, while of some academic interest, are largely
irrelevant to what Members of the 42d Congress intended by way of a standard for punitive
damages.
Id.
245. The Supreme Court has not proven singularly adept at divining Congress's intent with
respect to immunity for acts of discrimination against the disabled. Congress has on multiple
occasions reinstated the waiver of the states' l1th Amendment immunity that the Court errone-
ously concluded was not intended by Congress in enacting the disability discrimination statues.
See supra Part V.
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achieved in actions for damages under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, as the intent of the official remains an element of the prima
facie case. In Crawford-El v. Britton,2 4 6 the Supreme Court affirmed
that Harlow did not eliminate litigation of intent where the state-of-
mind issue is an element of plaintiff's prima facie case. Britton arose
out of an inmate's claim that prison officials misdirected boxes con-
taining his personal belongings in retaliation for the exercise of the
prisoner's First Amendment rights. Although Harlow had abolished
the intent issue under qualified immunity, the motivation of the offi-
cials remained as an element of plaintiff's First Amendment claim.
The court of appeals, however, interpreted Harlow as mandating an
across-the-board rule that government officials are entitled to disposi-
tion of state-of-mind issues before trial. Therefore, it elevated the
plaintiff's burden of establishing intent from the ordinary civil stan-
dard of a preponderance of the evidence, to the heightened standard
of clear and convincing evidence.247
Ruling that the court of appeals had misapprehended the scope
of Harlow, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court observed that its
holding in Harlow "related only to the scope of an affirmative defense
[providing] no support for making any change in the nature of the
plaintiff's burden of proving a constitutional violation. '2 48 The court
of appeals, however, had crafted its clear and convincing evidence re-
quirement to expedite resolution of plaintiff's prima facie case and not
the qualified immunity defense. Because the heightening of the bur-
den was not authorized by Harlow, the Court held, the lower court
lacked authority to legislate special rules for the general litigation of
intent claims.249
Britton confirms that the modification of the qualified immunity
in Harlow does not affect the litigation of the issue of intent as an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Because a plaintiff must
prove intent to discriminate to recover damages against an individual
official under the disability discrimination statutes, the costs of litigat-
ing the state-of-mind issue cannot be avoided.2 10 Therefore it is evi-
246. 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
247. See id. at 1589.
248. Id. at 1592.
249. See id. at 1585-86.
250. See Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[I]n evaluating a
defense of qualified immunity, an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind is proper where such
state of mind is an essential element of the underlying civil rights claim"); Sheppard v. Beerman,
94 F.3d 823, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court erred in finding intent irrele-
vant and denying discovery where subjective state of mind of defendant is an element of proof of
the constitutional violation); Ratliff v. DeKalb County, Ga., 62 F.3d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1995)
("[Iln qualified immunity cases, intent is a relevant inquiry if discriminatory intent is a specific
element of the constitutional tort .... ); Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1993)
("[D]espite Harlow's focus on a purely objective inquiry, the plaintiff must be afforded an ade-
quate opportunity to establish intent when it is an element of the alleged constitutional viola-
tion."); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir. 1988) (Harlow "did not rule out all
consideration of the official's discriminatory intent or motive in cases where, as here, the exist-
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dent that Congress would not have intended to revive the qualified
immunity defense after Harlow in a futile effort to spare litigation
costs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The courts that have permitted a qualified immunity defense
under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the IDEA have ne-
glected to consider the language and legislative history of the Acts and
have mistakenly extended the immunity available in actions under
§ 1983. The courts' endorsement of immunity frees those government
officials who persist in intentional discrimination from accountability
for their misconduct and undermines the unambiguous goal of Con-
gress to eliminate discrimination against the disabled. In holding that
money damages could be recovered for intentional discrimination in
an implied cause of action under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, the Supreme Court observed that "Congress surely did
not intend for federal monies to be expended to support the inten-
tional actions it sought by statute to proscribe."'25 ' By the same rea-
soning, Congress surely would not have intended to immunize
government officials who intentionally engage in the very discrimina-
tion that the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and IDEA were designed to
eradicate.
ence of a violation is dependent on proof of such intent."); Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police
Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("[W]hen the governing precedent identi-
fies the defendant's intent ... as an essential element of plaintiff's constitutional claim,... the
plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to overcome an asserted immunity with an offer of
proof of the defendant's alleged unconstitutional purpose.").
251. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
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